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A LOCALIST CRITIQUE OF THE
NEW FEDERALISM
DAVID J. BARRON†
INTRODUCTION
This Essay takes the recent federalism revival1 to rest, at least in
part, on a commitment to a more localized form of decisionmaking.
The notion that more governmental decisions could and should be
handled locally seems to fit with the times. There is increasing philosophical skepticism about the existence of “right” answers, more comfort with the notion that democracy depends upon reasonable disagreement, and growing uneasiness with top-down solutions that
threaten to entrench inefficiencies and squelch innovation. There also
is an undeniable appeal to the contention that community-level responses often have been the more creative ones of late. Even corporate bureaucracies now see the virtues of decentralization. The Supreme Court’s new federalism, in this respect, is of a piece with a
more thoroughgoing aversion to centralization and corresponding attraction to local decisionmaking. These localist instincts seem to be
defensible, even reasonable. Perhaps, even, progressive.
This Essay nevertheless argues that those who are attracted to
this localist orientation should be wary of the recent federalism revival. This revival focuses on protecting the autonomy of state and local governments by limiting the power of the central government. The
invocation of “local autonomy” conjures up the attractive values asCopyright © 2001 by David J. Barron.
† Assistant Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. This Essay is a response to papers
presented at the Constitution in Exile conference hosted by the Program in Public Law at Duke
University School of Law on October 5–7, 2000. I wish to thank Sam Bagenstos, Jerome Barron,
Myra Barron, Chris Desan, Dick Fallon, Jerry Frug, Daniel Halberstam, Elena Kagan, Jeff
Kehne, David Kennedy, Dan Meltzer, Frank Michelman, Charles Sabel, and Phil Weiser for
extremely helpful comments. I also wish to thank the Duke Program in Public Law, and in particular Chris Schroeder, for hosting an excellent conference.
1. See infra Part III.B.
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sociated with protecting localized decisionmaking: promoting responsive and participatory government by bringing the government closer
to the people; fostering diversity and experimentation by increasing
the fora for expressing policy choices and creating a competition for a
mobile citizenry; and providing a check against tyranny by diffusing
power that would otherwise be concentrated. These values are powerful ones. To trump them, the defender of central power traditionally
must show that the issue is really one of central, rather than local,
concern. Against the values of decentralization, the defender of central power must assert the virtues of centralization: the uniformity it
provides; the superior expertise, talent, or deliberative capacity that it
exhibits by drawing decisionmakers from a broader populace; the aggregate social welfare it promotes by requiring that costs of local action be internalized; or the central values that will be vindicated by
overcoming the dangers of faction and parochialism.2
The current federalism revival’s invocation of local autonomy
thus appears to vindicate the values associated with decentralization
that make a localist orientation attractive. And it thus would seem
that challenges to the federalism revival must rest on appeals to the
ways that centralized power can overcome the pathologies of local
decisionmaking. In this way, the current federalism revival draws
strength from the current skepticism towards centralization—with the
specter of big government and the constraints that it raises—and the
current ascendancy of decentralization, with the prospect of selfgovernment and freedom that it offers.
But local autonomy is a more complex concept than we often ac3
knowledge. Before we accept the suggestion that protecting local
autonomy from central power promotes localist values, it is important
to attend to the absence of a clear baseline in defining what local
autonomy means.4 The baseline problem arises because no city or
state is an island jurisdiction. The ability of each locality to make ef-

2. For surveys of these and other arguments for and against decentralized decisionmaking
in a federal system, see generally DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 107–40
(1995); Steven G. Calabresi, “A Government of Limited and Enumerated Power”: In Defense of
United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 774–84 (1995).
3. I use the term “local autonomy” to encompass both state and local governmental
autonomy.
4. The notion of baselines, and its attendant problems, has been addressed in other contexts. For example, Professor Sunstein discusses and criticizes the use of common law rules as
neutral baselines in connection with individual constitutional rights challenges to legislation.
Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 874–75 (1987).
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fective decisions on its own is inevitably shaped by its relation to
other cities and states, by its relation to broader, private market
forces, and, most importantly, by the way the central power structures
these relations, even when central governmental power appears to be
dormant. Because the local sphere is part and parcel of a larger coordinated system of local jurisdictions that is structured by less visible
background central-law rules, central power is often deeply (if not
visibly) implicated in what we understand local autonomy to mean.
Once one attends to this point, it becomes clear that a single-minded
desire to protect local autonomy by limiting central power actually
may do little to promote the values normally associated with local
autonomy.5
To the extent the Court’s current attempt to protect local autonomy is intended to promote the values associated with decentralized
6
decisionmaking, it errs in overlooking the baseline problem. It too
often takes the current amount of discretion that central law affords
local governments to be the baseline against which claimed central
governmental infringements of local autonomy are measured. By
viewing the existing, centrally established structure as a “neutral”
5. In assessing how law can protect the autonomy of individuals, rather than governmental entities, it is clear that much depends on what one takes autonomy to mean. For example,
one can distinguish between autonomy as negative liberty, in which the emphasis is on freeing
individuals from governmentally imposed restraints, and autonomy as positive liberty, in which
the emphasis is on empowering individuals through governmentally provided assistance. See
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 875, 880–85 (1994) (contrasting negative and positive libertarian conceptions of descriptive autonomy). Cross-cutting
these notions of autonomy are two other senses of autonomy: ascriptive autonomy and descriptive autonomy. The former emphasizes the autonomy that one is entitled to exercise by virtue of
being an individual, and thus conceives of autonomy in metaphysical terms that make it meaningless to assess how autonomous a person is in fact. Id. at 890–93. The latter conceives of
autonomy as an “empirical condition or capacity or an ideal for human life,” and thus makes it
meaningful to assess how autonomous specific persons are in fact. Id. at 879–80. The precise
connection between the vocabulary developed for thinking about the autonomy of individuals
and the effort to untangle what should count as autonomy for governmental entities in a federal
system is not at all clear. Governments are not just like private individuals and thus there is no
reason to assume that well-developed notions of individual autonomy are appropriately deployed in thinking about the autonomy of governmental entities. Referencing the contestability
of the concept of autonomy in connection with the rights of individuals, however, does point to
the contestability of the concept of autonomy in thinking about the rights of states and local
governments in a federal system.
6. It is, of course, possible that this is not the point of these decisions at all. Their point
simply may be to implement faithfully the Founders’ intent in establishing states or to respect
the constitutional text’s enumeration of federal powers and the Tenth Amendment, even
though such faithful implementation may produce none of the benefits that are associated with
the localist orientation described above. It is only insofar as the decisions seem normatively attractive because of their association with that localist orientation that this critique applies.
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baseline that protects local autonomy, the Court fails to consider how
that structure itself acts as a constraint on local autonomy. As a consequence, it does not consider the possibility that changes in central
law actually may be shifting the relative autonomy of localities, vis-àvis each other, rather than limiting local autonomy across the board.
Nor does the Court consider that the allegedly infringing central law,
by altering the background framework within which local power is
exercised, may be creating new opportunities for exercising local
power that were not available under the old centrally established
framework. So, for example, the Court recently has held that, in the
name of protecting local autonomy, the federal government is prohibited from commandeering a local government.7 The Court does
not contemplate, however, that such commands may promote local
autonomy by altering the background legal structure in a way that
protects local governments from the costs that the current, centrally
established legal framework permits local governments to impose
upon their neighbors. In other words, the Court ignores—wrongly, I
argue—both the ways the preexisting centrally created legal regime
may be limiting local autonomy and the ways a new, seemingly less
protective centrally established legal regime actually might enhance
it.
Inattention to the baseline problem also occurs outside the
sphere of constitutional doctrine. The force of the intuitive claim that
central law is a constraint on, rather than a component of, local
8
autonomy threatens to tag many important recent reform proposals
with a “big government” label they do not deserve. Because such
9
proposals call for the significant exercise of central power, they are
7.
8.

Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997).
See, e.g., U.S. ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE
LAWS GOVERNING LOCAL GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE AND ADMINISTRATION 1–5 (1993)
(treating central intervention as a threat to local autonomy); Gordon L. Clark, A Theory of Local Autonomy, 74 ANNALS ASS’N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 195, 199–203 (1984) (promoting a theory
of local autonomy based on immunity from higher state authority and legislative initiative reposed in local residents).
9. See GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING
WALLS 86–88 (1999) (discussing the virtues of a regional legislature charged with negotiating
the entitlements to be held by local governments); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 316–23 (1998) (suggesting
ways of reconceiving the central and local governmental relationship in which local discretion is
enhanced even as national monitoring and supervision is rendered more intensive); cf. Clayton
P. Gillette, Regionalization and Interlocal Bargains, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 190, 195 (2001) (discussing the role that background rules of state law play in frustrating and inducing interlocal
bargains).
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seen as a threat to local autonomy, implicating the familiar clash between the benefits of decentralized decisionmaking on the one hand,
and the benefits of centralized decisionmaking on the other.10 Once
one acknowledges the more complicated relationship between local
autonomy and central power, however, these proposals are better understood as efforts to alter the central frameworks within which local
discretion is inevitably exercised, rather than as attempts to substitute
centralized command for local control. From this perspective, such
proposals are no more threats to local control than the less visible,
centrally imposed frameworks they would replace.
To pursue this argument, this Essay examines not only the law of
federalism, which defines the relations of the federal government visà-vis state and local governments, but also the law of localism, which
defines the relations between states and their local governments.
There are some natural points of connection between these two bodies of law. Federalism decisions often involve local, rather than state,
governmental parties; indeed, the decisions are often unclear as to
whether it is a commitment to the free exercise of local, rather than
state, power that drives them. And to the extent that the federalism
revival is motivated by a desire to protect local control, it is critical to
think about how law protects local control within states, and not simply state control as against the federal government. Many of the most
important matters of public policy—from crime control to education
to land-use planning—are resolved to an important degree through
local, rather than state, governmental decisionmaking.
The law of localism also provides a useful comparative perspective from which to consider the law of federalism. The idea that background provisions of central law powerfully shape the scope of local
autonomy is much easier to grasp in the context of state-local relations than it is in federal-state relations. The longstanding notion that
local governments are creatures of their states makes it hard to see
how local autonomy within states could be meaningfully understood
independent of the way that state law chooses to protect it. And once
the complications that arise in trying to protect local autonomy within
states are seen, it becomes apparent that similar complications arise
10. See, e.g., Gillette, supra note 9, at 197 n.21 (equating proposal to establish regional legislature to change background state law rules with the centralization that attends the establishment of a consolidated, regional government); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Romancing the Town:
Why We (Still) Need a Democratic Defense of City Power, 113 HARV. L. REV. 2009, 2012 (2000)
(“Any expansion of regional power will inherently diminish citizen interaction and voice in local
government.”).
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within the law of federalism, notwithstanding the fact that states are
not merely creatures of the national government. It then becomes
possible to see that central governmental power may be defended at
all levels of the constitutional structure in the name of promoting the
virtues that attend local governmental decisionmaking. Indeed, it
shows that those virtues may even be undermined by a legal system
that commits itself—as the Supreme Court now appears to be committed—to seeking out a separate sphere of local autonomy that must
be protected from central lawmaking.
Part I sets forth the conceptual framework for the more detailed
arguments that follow by specifying what counts as a localist argument for central power, as opposed to an argument for central power
that seeks to overcome the pathologies of local decisionmaking. Part
II examines the law of localism and the ways state power creates,
rather than simply limits, local autonomy. Part III draws on the law of
localism to consider the law of federalism. I show how the current law
of federalism overlooks the baseline problem in its defense of local
autonomy and thus constitutes a poor way of promoting the values
associated with localism.
I. WHAT COUNTS AS A LOCALIST ARGUMENT FOR
CENTRAL POWER
There is a value in ensuring that local jurisdictions have the discretion to make the decisions that their residents wish them to make.
The value inheres in the traditional advantages that attend decentralization. These include more participatory and responsive government; more diversity of policy experimentation; more flexibility in responding to changing circumstances; and more diffusion of
11
governmental power, which in turn checks tyranny. Precisely because there is a value in protecting local decisionmaking power, however, it is important not to overlook the ways in which the absence of
visible central intervention may undermine local power.
Admittedly, one must accept that local autonomy is a complex
concept before preemptive central lawmaking can be seen as poten-

11. See SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 58–106 (surveying arguments for decentralization in the
federal system); Calabresi, supra note 2, at 774–79 (discussing various arguments in favor of
state power, including the possibility of tailored response to local predilections, market competition among regions, experimentation, and improved decisionmaking and administration). For
variants of each of these arguments on behalf of decentralization, see generally ALEXIS
DETOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1840).
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tially productive of local autonomy. We usually think of local autonomy in what might be considered procedural, formal, or ascriptive
terms. This way of thinking emphasizes the freedom of local discretion that would exist but for the enactment of a visibly interfering
central law. Local autonomy is presented as the natural condition of
being free from central interference, and thus central interference is
by definition threatening. But that is not the only way—let alone the
best way—of understanding local autonomy. We also can understand
local autonomy in what might be considered substantive, material, or
descriptive terms. This way of thinking emphasizes the freedom of local discretion that would be produced by altering the kinds of limits
on local authority that are already, and necessarily, established by less
visible provisions of central law. Local autonomy then becomes denaturalized; it is always a function of the way that central law structures the effective decisionmaking capacity of local entities. Preemptive central lawmaking, by this way of thinking, is as likely to be
productive of local autonomy as it is to be threatening to it.
Importantly, an acceptance of this way of thinking does not render all exercises of central power the same when viewed from a localist perspective. The fact that central power shapes local autonomy
does not mean that all exercises of central power promote local
autonomy. Consider, in this connection, two very different ways of
justifying central legislation. One way is centralist; it seeks to justify
central legislation in the name of vindicating some independent interest of the central government—say, equality or efficiency—that would
be frustrated by respecting local autonomy, no matter whether we
understand that concept in the usual way or in the more complex way
described above. Central laws that have this end do not seek to promote localist values; they seek to trump them. Their purpose is to
substitute a central decisionmaker for the more selfish or less competent local decisionmaker that otherwise would have control. The
other way of justifying central legislation is localist. It draws on the
substantive, material, or descriptive way of understanding local
autonomy, and seeks to defend central lawmaking as a useful response to less visible constraints on local decisionmaking capacity
that already have been imposed by separate, background provisions
of central law. The purpose of these laws is to empower local governments to make policies that the current, centrally established legal
regime constrains them from making. Central laws that have this end
do not seek to trump localist values; they seek to promote them in a
way that the prior legal regime foreclosed.
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To see what underlies the distinction, imagine the following case:
Local governments are free, under state law, to decide
whether to provide protection against private discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation. The state legislature is con12
sidering legislation to bar such discrimination.
Does this state legislation pose a threat to local autonomy? One
might conclude that it does, but nevertheless try to justify it along distinctly centralist lines. One might concede that, in the absence of state
legislation, local governments have the autonomy to resolve this issue
as they wish. One could conclude that, in the absence of the preemptive state legislation, it is quite likely that each local jurisdiction has
the power to decide whether to provide such protection on the basis
of its own judgment about the community’s need for such measures,
the morality of the measures, and the costs they would impose on current residents. On this view, the background legal structure that central law has established does not have a significant influence on the
local government’s decisions regarding the adoption of such ordinances.13
Accepting this account, one still could defend the state legislation. The defense of the state statute would have to proceed, however, along the lines familiarly used to defend centralization against
the pathologies of decentralization. One would need to argue that
there is a special need to protect minority rights;14 a peculiar risk of
faction at the local level;15 or a transcendent moral imperative that the
16
state as a whole must recognize uniformly. In other words, the de12. The argument works the same way if its analysis starts from the assumption that the
state legislature is considering enacting a law that would bar local laws prohibiting such discrimination.
13. For an argument that local governments make judgments on this issue in just this way,
see Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289, 291 (6th
Cir. 1997) (upholding a local amendment to the city charter precluding the city council from
adopting ordinances conferring “special class status . . . based upon sexual orientation, conduct
or relationships”) (citation omitted). Of course, even this way of thinking naturalizes the local
governmental boundaries themselves. Were central law to set the local entity’s boundaries differently, the “local” decision might change as well. But here, the central government is not
choosing to change local boundaries; it is instead choosing to ignore local decisionmaking institutions altogether.
14. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 77–84 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(discussing the role of a large union as a bulwark against factionalism).
15. See id. (noting the advantages of a republic over a democracy and a large over a small
republic in containing the influence of factious leaders beyond their particular states).
16. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 178–84 (1986) (discussing concerns with the
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fender of state intervention would justify the infringement on local
autonomy in the name of a state policy that would be frustrated by
respecting the values associated with local autonomy. The centralist
tilt of this defense depends upon the premise that local governments
would enjoy autonomy in the absence of the state intervention. Because there is force to the intuition that local autonomy exists in the
absence of central lawmaking, the defender of the central intervention must justify its exercise by emphasizing the costs of respecting local autonomy.17
Consider, on the other hand, another case concerning state preemption in which the localist argument for central lawmaking is quite
easy to articulate.
Local governments are not, in the absence of state intervention, free to determine the amount of resources they allocate
to improving air quality. Local decisionmaking is constrained
by the approaches to improving air quality that are adopted in
neighboring jurisdictions. A neighboring jurisdiction that is
lax in policing air quality, or that encourages its industry to locate at the perimeter, may powerfully affect its neighbor’s
choices about the resources that should be devoted to combating air pollution. The state legislature is considering a law
18
to preempt lax air pollution policies.

legitimacy of “checkerboard laws” on matters of principle); SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 50–57
(discussing the need for national power to safeguard individual and group concerns).
17. If one doubted whether something meaningfully understood as local autonomy would
exist in the absence of state intervention, then one could defend the state intervention along
localist lines. For example, the threat to local autonomy would not be so stark if one were convinced that state law rules that promote interjurisdictional competition—rules such as those
permitting each locality to retain the taxes that it levies—for employers (or employees) were in
fact constraining the choices of many local governments prior to the passage of the preemptive
statute. The desire not to be marked as a locality friendly (or unfriendly) to gays and lesbians
might constrain local autonomy in a way that it would not be constrained if the local jurisdiction
were truly an island or if the state law rules defining local power were different. To be sure, in
“freeing” localities from the grip of competition or altering the social meaning of choosing to
adopt (or not adopt) a state or local law in this area, the state legislation also would be imposing
legal obligations in jurisdictions that had not themselves wished to have its residents subject to
such antidiscrimination obligations. But one concerned with protecting local autonomy would
want to know the extent to which, in preventing those localities from resolving the matter as
they chose, the state legislation also was making it possible for other local governments to adopt
gay rights ordinances that would not have been possible under the prior state law regime.
18. Again, for present purposes, the problem is no different if the state law would preempt
local discretion in a way that would exacerbate the negative externalities imposed by the neighboring locality.
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Does this state legislation infringe local autonomy? The localist
defense of the statute is easily offered. The preemptive statute clearly
would limit local autonomy in some respects. It would frustrate the
policy choices of those jurisdictions with lax air pollution laws, and it
would prohibit all local jurisdictions from enjoying the freedom to
adopt the now-barred policy. But it also would enhance the decisionmaking discretion of those local jurisdictions now subjected to extralocal costs by the absence of central preemption of lax air pollution
policies. These jurisdictions could allocate more resources to other
policies they wished to pursue if they no longer had to respond to the
negative externalities imposed upon them by their neighbors—negative externalities that the prior rules of central law required them to
accept.
There is, in a case of this type, no clear baseline from which an
19
argument for local autonomy can proceed. There are localist arguments both for and against the central law at issue. Local autonomy is
in one sense limited by the preemptive central command that directly
seeks to constrain the exercise of local power. Viewed from a different baseline, however, local autonomy already is limited by background, centrally established, legal rules that define the horizontal
relations between localities and permit some localities to avoid costs
that others are then required to bear. From this perspective, the absence of a central law that attempts to alter these preexisting, centrally established, horizontal legal relations itself limits local autonomy. Thus, a case of this sort requires the central government to
make a policy judgment about the type of local autonomy that it
wishes to promote rather than a choice about whether to trump local
autonomy in the name of some greater central governmental interest.
The state government’s choice to adopt the preemptive law
might depend on an independent assessment of the state’s interest in
combating air pollution—say, a judgment that requiring the costs of
20
pollution to be internalized will promote cleaner air statewide. But it

19. Cf. Sunstein, supra note 4, at 874–75 (discussing the problem of baselines in connection
with individual constitutional rights).
20. For arguments that emphasize the suboptimal national environmental policy that might
result from protecting local autonomy from central intervention in the face of negative externalities, see SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 40–42 (arguing that “when market imperfections call for
some regulatory action, social welfare is more likely to be maximized when such action is taken
on a national level”); Richard L. Revesz, The Control of Interstate Environmental Externalities
in a Federal System, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 883, 883–85 (1996) (arguing for the “internalization of
interstate environmental externalities in a federal system” in the context of the Clean Air Act).
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also might depend upon an assessment of whether state intervention
would free more local jurisdictions from extralocal pressures than it
would constrain, or upon whether it would relieve local jurisdictions
of qualitatively or quantitatively greater constraints on their autonomy than they would confront in the absence of the central law. In
making that assessment, one would have to count the likelihood that
state air quality would improve as a benefit of the potential state intervention. But one also would have to count as a benefit the likelihood that many local jurisdictions would have more resources to devote to other governmental projects at the local level—resources that
otherwise would be devoted to attending to the costs imposed upon
them by their neighbors.
In this way, the call for central action rests less on a fear that respecting local power will undermine a more general, statewide interest than on a recognition that the opportunities for the exercise of local power might be enhanced by preemptive action that removes
existing constraints on local discretion. A recent cartoon in the New
Republic well illustrates the idea. It depicts a factory in one state billowing smoke across the state line. A citizen of each state stands at his
respective border. The citizen of the state that is home to the factory
says: “The EPA turned pollution regulation over to our state and
we’re turning it over to yours.”21 Limiting central power in this context does not promote local autonomy in any obvious way.
The pollution hypothetical highlights a broader point about the
autonomy of local jurisdictions in the absence of visible central intervention. A locality’s autonomy may in fact be constrained in a number of ways by background rules of central law that too often are
taken to be natural. The ways central law requires local jurisdictions
to accept the costs of direct negative externalities—like pollution—
22
furnishes only one example. Local autonomy also may be
constrained, as has already been suggested, by the competitive
pressures that central law permits local jurisdictions to impose upon
one another.23 Local autonomy also may be limited by broader forces
21. Tom Toles, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 6, 2001, at 8 (cartoon).
22. With respect to negative externalities, at the national level, consider the fact that states
are limited in their power to adopt protectionist legislation. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978) (invalidating a New Jersey statute prohibiting importation of
out-of-state waste).
23. It is arguable that federal intervention to restrain interjurisdictional competition cannot
be defended on localist grounds. Since a restraint on competition in one area will just result in
the competition moving to another area, ultimately the only way to upend interjurisdictional
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in the private market that no local jurisdiction is equipped to address
on its own, given the way central law defines local power.24 Finally, a
local entity’s autonomy may be constrained by still other, less visible
provisions of central law that impose burdens that would be left in
place even if the supposedly infringing central governmental statute
were invalidated or repealed.25 The effects of these extralocal constraints may be just as burdensome on local autonomy, as a practical
matter, as would the effects of the new, preemptive central law that
may be challenged by a particular locality. Each of these constraints
would remain in place, however, even if that challenged central intervention were prohibited.
As a result, the effort to protect local autonomy may be incomplete, and perhaps counterproductive, unless one considers how the
particular central intervention that is the object of localist ire interacts
with these less visible centrally imposed constraints. A failure to do so
only encourages a committed localist reflexively to favor the distribution and kind of local autonomy that existed prior to the challenged
central intervention and to overlook the possibilities for localism that
the challenged central law might bring forth. Attention to the way
central lawmaking may relieve extralocal constraints demonstrates,
therefore, that more is at issue in many central-local clashes than the
relative merits and demerits of permitting the central government’s
interest to trump the virtues of protecting local autonomy. Also at is-

competition is to nationalize decisionmaking completely. See Richard L. Revesz, The Race to the
Bottom and Federal Environmental Regulation: A Response to Critics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 535,
540 (1997) (noting that in the context of environmental regulation, the federalization of all
regulatory and fiscal decisions is necessary to prevent suboptimal lax standards); Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race to the Bottom” Rationale for
Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1244–47 (1992) (concluding that the
“race-to-the-bottom argument is an argument against federalism”). In addition, one might contend that the very point of protecting local autonomy is to promote interjurisdictional competition. From this perspective, interjurisdictional competition cannot be understood as a threat to
local autonomy. It is simply the natural byproduct of protecting local autonomy. Such a contention would, of course, have to be defended against other plausible accounts of what should be
understood to be a natural byproduct of respecting local autonomy—such as, for example, cooperation rather than competition. Whatever the merits of these contentions about the relationship between interjurisdictional competition and local autonomy, none of the examples that
follows involves federal statutes that are justified as necessary to forestall suboptimal interjurisdictional competition.
24. See, e.g., Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 548 (1975) (upholding federal legislation to
freeze wages paid by state and local governmental employers in the face of severe national inflation).
25. For a similar point, see PAUL E. PETERSON, CITY LIMITS 66–92 (1981) (arguing for a
new theory of federalism to explain interaction among governmental levels).
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sue are the definition of “local autonomy” and whether it would be
well protected in the absence of a particular central law.
To be sure, the contention that preemptive central lawmaking
may promote local autonomy relies on arguments for central power
that are in some respects familiar. It is hardly novel to contend, for
example, that central lawmaking may be needed to respond to interlocal externalities or to effectuate interlocal redistribution. However,
these classic arguments for central power often are understood as
centralist arguments for the promotion of some value—such as efficiency or equal treatment—that can be realized only by acknowledging and overcoming the pathologies that attend smaller-scale decisionmaking. This way of understanding the function of central power
is a partial one that has important and unfortunate consequences. If
the successful defense of each central intervention depends upon emphasizing the costs of respecting local decisionmaking authority, then
an argument for central power inevitably invites the counterargument
that central power threatens the values protected by local autonomy.
Once one sees the localist dimension in these classic arguments for
central intervention, however, the calculus changes. The conventional
rejoinder to such exercises of central power becomes weaker when
the central law can be understood to promote the values associated
with the preservation of local autonomy. Moreover, the argument for
central power no longer points inevitably towards ever-increasing
centralization. To be defended credibly on localist grounds, the central law must be shown to promote local discretion even as it also
limits it. It is not enough to show that it promotes some value of
worth to the central government as a whole.
One final point should be emphasized. The mere fact that a preemptive state law sets forth a state policy that may be preferred by
the residents of some localities does not mean that it thereby vindicates localism. A state law that limits pollution is not localist just because residents in a majority of local jurisdictions prefer clean air. For
the central intervention to be localist in the way I intend, the state law
would have to promote the capacity of the local government to adopt
policies that current central law frustrates. Preference matching
alone, therefore, does not suffice to promote the values associated
with localism. Those values are promoted only when central law
changes the background legal rules in a way that expands—even as it
also may contract—the opportunities for local governments to
achieve preferred policies for themselves. Thus, a state law against
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pollution is localist only because it frees localities from extralocally
imposed costs that limit the kinds of policy choices they can make.
With this background in place, it is useful to turn to a consideration of the law of localism. Such an examination reveals that much
state lawmaking that appears to threaten local autonomy is defensible
on localist grounds. It then will be possible for those attracted to a localist orientation to see some of the problems with the United States
Supreme Court’s recent federalism decisions.
II. THE LAW OF LOCALISM
When we consider the relations between states and their local
governments, it immediately becomes clear that significant complications arise for those interested in protecting local autonomy. State law
plays a very visible (if often ignored) role in defining what local
autonomy means for local governments. As a result, a state law that
appears to limit local autonomy when viewed from one baseline, actually may promote it when viewed from another.
A. The Breadth of Formal State Power
The way that central law operates to protect local power is complicated. As a formal legal matter, the federal Constitution does not
treat local governments as anything approximating coequal sovereigns.26 States have the power to approve and establish local governments. That is true as a matter of state constitutional law as well.
State legislatures have broad powers to structure the internal governance structure of local governments and, in certain circumstances, to,
in effect, place them in receivership.27
In addition, state legislatures possess the formal legal power to
delegate large swaths of authority to their local governments or to
26. See, e.g., Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907):
Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the State, created as convenient
agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the State as may be entrusted to them. For the purpose of executing these powers properly and efficiently
they usually are given the power to acquire, hold, and manage personal and real
property. The number, nature and duration of the powers conferred upon these corporations and the territory over which they shall be exercised rests in the absolute
discretion of the State.
27. See, e.g., Powers v. Sec’y of Admin., 587 N.E.2d 744, 751 (Mass. 1992) (upholding a
state-imposed receiver against a state constitutional home rule challenge). But cf. City of La
Grande v. Pub. Employe[e]s Ret. Bd., 576 P.2d 1204, 1208 (Or. 1978) (suggesting that state constitutional home rule provisions might limit the state’s powers to regulate the form of local governmental organization).
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withhold such powers from them as the legislatures choose.28 They
possess as well the authority to commandeer local governments to
perform certain tasks, and, in many circumstances, to impose un29
funded mandates upon them. State governments also possess the
power to set limits upon the authority of local governments to raise
revenue for themselves and the power to redistribute that revenue
30
among localities. In short, state constitutional law overwhelmingly
favors expansive state supremacy over local governments.
Indeed, some of the more significant state constitutional limitations on the state’s power to define its relationship to its local governments expressly point in the direction of ensuring state supremacy.
For example, some state constitutions expressly limit the state legislature’s authority to augment the power of local governments to borrow
31
money.
There is a countervailing tradition in state constitutional law.
There have been contentions that inherent in the state constitutional
system is a traditional right to local self-government that is intended
to protect the local sphere from central intrusion. Thomas Cooley,
Amos Eaton, and other now-forgotten figures from the latter part of
the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth century, made an effort
32
to put forth such a claim. Their claims by and large failed, however.
More importantly, there has been a longstanding tradition of
33
home rule that began in 1875 and that has persisted over time. The
28. See FRANK I. MICHELMAN & TERRANCE SANDALOW, MATERIALS ON GOVERNMENT
URBAN AREAS: CASES-COMMENTS-QUESTIONS 234–51 (1970) (discussing the issue of delegation of power to local governments).
29. U.S. ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, MANDATES: CASES
IN STATE-LOCAL RELATIONS 4–6 (1990). There are, however, state constitutional provisions
that require such mandates to be funded. See, e.g., ME. CONST. art. IX.
30. See, e.g., GERALD FRUG, RICHARD T. FORD & DAVID J. BARRON, LOCAL
GOVERNMENT LAW 655–57 (3d ed. 2001) (noting the limitations that states often impose on the
ability of cities and municipalities to generate revenue); OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS, JR., LOCAL
GOVERNMENT LAW 110–12 (2d ed. 2001) (discussing conflicts between state and local governments over financial matters).
31. See, e.g., Mun. Bldg. Auth. v. Lowder, 711 P.2d 273, 277 (Utah 1985) (discussing the
importance of such limitations under the Utah Constitution); REYNOLDS, supra note 30, at 309–
18 (discussing state constitutional debt limits generally).
32. See David J. Barron, The Promise of Cooley’s City: Traces of Local Constitutionalism,
147 U. PA. L. REV. 487, 487–546 (1999) (discussing Cooley’s conception of a right to local selfgovernment); Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1113–17
(1980) (discussing Cooley and Eaton and the failure of their approach to win adherents).
33. See generally DALE KRANE ET AL., HOME RULE IN AMERICA: A FIFTY-STATE
HANDBOOK 1–21 (2001) (discussing the history, policy, political philosophy, and social importance of home rule among the nation’s fifty states).
IN
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majority of states now confer some constitutionally recognized measure of home rule power upon local governments. Home rule provisions typically confer upon municipalities power over local or municipal affairs. These provisions are themselves reflective of the
expansive nature of formal state power over local matters.
Home rule provisions perform two quite distinct functions. On
the one hand, they are mini-Tenth Amendments designed to cordon
off local matters from state intervention. They provide a constitutional defense against state assertions of preemptive power. Very few
state cases, however, have construed these home rule provisions in
this fashion. It is the relatively rare state court case that holds the
state legislature unable to intervene on a matter over which a local
government wishes to exercise control. The other function is a powergranting function. Local governments do not possess reserved powers
in the way that states do. They are creatures of their states and possess only those powers that the states specifically have chosen to vest
in them. No powers arise simply from the fact that they are “governments.” Traditionally, particularized state grants of power have been
construed narrowly to ensure that the delegate relationship is preserved. Home rule provisions serve the important function, then, of
enabling local governments to operate and exercise authority in the
absence of a particularized grant of state power. They are a kind of
mini-Article I for local governments, in the sense that they enumerate
their authority over local or municipal affairs.34 But in doing so, they
grant power to local governments to act; they do not immunize local
actions from state preemption.
It is fair to say that hardly any impediments to the exercise of
state power vis-à-vis local governments exist in state constitutional
law, and certainly none exist that would be comparable to the kind of
impediments now being adopted in the United States Supreme
Court’s recent federalism cases. There are few, if any, matters of concern to state residents that, as a formal legal matter, the state legislature would be barred from addressing because of the need to respect
35
the rights to self-government of local communities.
34. See Terrance Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A Role for
the Courts, 48 MINN. L. REV. 643, 648–52 (1964) (discussing grants of authority to municipal
governments and limitations placed on state legislatures’ authority to legislate concerning municipal issues as separate aspects of home rule).
35. It would be too much to say that there are no such limits. For example, some courts
have invalidated state legislation mandating revenue-sharing as violating state constitutional
protections for what it deems to be local autonomy. See, e.g., Buse v. Smith, 247 N.W.2d 141,
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In this respect, local governments might seem to stand in a very
different relation to their states than states do to the national government. Whatever the scope of federal constitutional limits on state
power should be, it is clear that states never have been understood to
be mere creatures of the national government in the way that local
governments have been understood to be mere creatures of their
states. Nevertheless, as the next section shows, state law has proved
far more receptive to the ascriptive, formal or procedural idea of local
autonomy, and thus to the notion that local freedom depends upon
the absence of visible state intervention, than this formal description
of state power would lead one to suspect.
B. The Reality of Local Power
The formal regime of supreme state legislative authority notwithstanding, it is widely perceived that, under state law, local governments enjoy a great degree of what is termed local autonomy under
state law. The force of local autonomy as a constraint on state power
is the conventional premise from which many contemporary assess36
ments of the state-local relationship proceed. This premise makes
clear that there is no logical connection between a regime of constitutional law that assumes central supremacy and does little to protect
local power through judicially enforceable norms and a political environment that favors central over local power. Local autonomy—or, at
least, something widely perceived to be local autonomy—is alive and
well under state law despite an overwhelming state constitutional
premise that localism is to be the exception rather than rule.37
To say that state law protects local control is not to explain, however, what is meant by that statement. What is it about state law, as
currently constituted, that makes it sensible to conclude that it protects local control? Three features of state law commonly are identified as evidencing its localist character. Each appears to be funda143 (Wis. 1976) (striking down state-mandated, interlocal revenue sharing for public education).
There also are state constitutional prohibitions against special legislation that may limit a state’s
capacity to regulate a particular city, but these often are honored in the breach.
36. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local Government
Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1–115 (1990) [hereinafter Briffault, Our Localism: Part I] (discussing the influence of localism on American local government law); Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II—Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 346–454 (1990) [hereinafter
Briffault, Our Localism: Part II] (discussing the theoretical defenses of localism).
37. See Richard Briffault, The Role of Local Control in School Finance Reform, 24 CONN.
L. REV. 773, 776–85 (1990) (explaining the relationship between formal state supremacy and
local control in the area of public education).
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mental to local control; by and large, state law seems to regard each
feature as a key power of local communities that states are loathe to
upset.
The first feature is the way that state law structures the funding
of local governments. States might choose to fund local governments
in a variety of ways. Revenues could be raised exclusively by statewide income taxes that then would be redistributed locally according
to some state-sanctioned formula. England does something like this
right now: it collects and redistributes not only income taxes but also
commercial and industrial property taxes.38 Or revenues could be
raised locally through taxes, as they are now, but then shared between
communities through a state-administered fund. The Twin Cities in
Minnesota have pioneered this approach at the regional level.39
In the main, however, all fifty states have opted to authorize local governments both to impose taxes locally—whether they be sales
taxes or property taxes—and to keep the revenues for the exclusive
benefit of local residents. This approach encourages each municipality to conceive of the property—industrial, commercial, and residential—within its jurisdiction as its own tax base, rather than as property
open to be taxed for the benefit of the statewide public as a whole.
The locally taxable revenue generated by that property does not have
to be shared with the state as a whole, or even with neighboring jurisdictions. So workers from the central city who travel to a suburb to
work during the day may spend money in suburban stores. The resulting locally set sales taxes are for the suburb to keep. Similarly, the
property taxes levied against a downtown office complex are for the
central city to keep—no matter how many of the people who work in
that building reside in neighboring communities.40 Many consider this
right to treat property within local boundaries as property available
for local benefit alone to be critical to what is understood as local
autonomy.41

38. See DAVID WILSON & CHRIS GAME, LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
151–94 (2d ed. 1998) (discussing the financing of local governments in the United Kingdom).
39. See MYRON ORFIELD, METROPOLITICS: A REGIONAL AGENDA FOR COMMUNITY
AND STABILITY 142–49, 152 (1997) (discussing the tax sharing plan in the Twin Cities).
40. See FRUG, supra note 9, at 104–05 (“By defining the tax base in terms of the property
found within a jurisdiction and by defining the beneficiaries of the tax base in terms of residency, local government law creates and intensifies inequality within the metropolitan area.”).
41. See, e.g., Briffault, Our Localism: Part II, supra note 36, at 349 (“The logic of local legal
autonomy assumes local solutions to local problems, with local programs funded by taxes on
local property.”).
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Certain exceptions are made to this general system when some
fundamental right is at issue. Many states have recognized this point
in the context of school funding. These states generally have justified
a departure from the typical rules regarding which locality “owns” local tax revenue by pointing to the special role that education plays in
the state or the unique right to a public education granted by the state
constitution. Education, then, is thought to be a sufficiently important
statewide matter to justify an exception to the normal rules of play,
rules that are taken for granted as the essence of our system of local
42
self-government.
The second feature of state law evidencing its localist character is
the way that state law structures the exercise of certain local police
powers, such as the regulation of land use, within local boundary
lines. Again, land-use decisions could be handled within a state in a
variety of ways. Generally speaking, however, most states—and until
relatively recently nearly all states—have settled on a single course:
43
largely unconstrained local land-use authority. As a result, state law
generally authorizes local governments to determine how much, if
any, commercial property will be permitted within certain areas of the
municipality. It authorizes them to determine as well what kinds of
housing will be permitted within municipal limits. Will the land within
the municipality be zoned only for single-family housing or will multifamily housing be permitted as well? Will manufactured housing be
excluded or permitted? Will apartment dwellers be welcomed or
shunned? Will lot sizes be large or small? Will garages be required or
forbidden? Most states have long since determined that the answer to
each of these questions is appropriately the province of local decisionmaking. And land use is not the only policy area in which such
discretion is conferred.44
The final localist aspect of state law concerns the very definition
of what constitutes a local government. State law leaves local government formation largely to the discretion of the persons within a
particular territorial space. Persons within an area are permitted to
form a local government through incorporation, often with little or no

42. For a comprehensive listing of the relevant cases, see Kelly Cochran, Comment, Beyond School Financing: Defining the Constitutional Right to an Adequate Education, 78 N.C. L.
REV. 399, 402 n.22 (2000).
43. See Briffault, Our Localism: Part I, supra note 36, at 19, 39–48 (1990) (describing state
law as generally allowing for “unfettered local control over land use”).
44. See Briffault, supra note 37, at 785–99 (discussing local control over educational policy).
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meaningful state-level review.45 And, in addition, annexation is made
quite difficult under state law so that local governmental integrity is
preserved once established.46 Local governmental power to avoid consolidation is preserved further by generous state law rules that permit
local governments to preserve their integrity and to contract for services to avoid having to expand their boundaries to encompass resi47
dents of less affluent districts. As with the previous two examples,
alternative approaches are possible. For example, states rigorously
could police the formation of new local governments, treating each
new entity as a kind of administrative agency that could be formed
only in the event that the state legislature thought it beneficial to do
so.48
These three features make state law appear solicitous of local
power. First, the revenues for each local government are generated to
an important degree internally, such that the wealth within a jurisdiction is understood to be the taxable prey of that jurisdiction alone.
Second, broad delegations of land use and other police powers make
each of these seemingly pre-political, and inviolable, republics free to
exercise power within its domain of authority. Finally, the generous
rules concerning local government formation make each local government appear to be the consequence of pre-political action rather
than state law construction.49 The preservation of the territorial integrity of local governments once formed, moreover, affords them a degree of indestructibility that mimics that enjoyed by the states themselves.
These three aspects of state law combine to ensure that states
leave many of the critical issues that confront the residents of every
state—housing, education, crime, explosive growth and related prob-

45. See Briffault, Our Localism: Part I, supra note 36, at 73–77 (discussing the relative
freedom and autonomy of local municipalities in the context of incorporation).
46. See KENNETH JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE
UNITED STATES 138–56 (1985) (describing the increased powers of localities to resist annexations); Briffault, Our Localism: Part I, supra note 36, at 77–81 (arguing that many state laws
concerning annexation are inherently localist).
47. See GARY MILLER, CITIES BY CONTRACT 17, 20–22, 34–37, 81–85 (1981) (discussing
what is known as the Lakewood Plan, which permitted interlocal contracts that empowered
some communities to incorporate and resist annexation).
48. Id. at 100–03, 107–10.
49. See Richard Ford, Geography and Sovereignty: Jurisdictional Formation and Racial
Segregation, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1365, 1365 (1997) (describing how state and federal law treats the
formation of local governments as an act of passive recognition of an already extant community
rather than affirmative state action to create such a community).
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lems of sprawl—to local governments in important respects. In other
words, insofar as the state has intervened—and, of course, states have
had no choice but to intervene, given that local governments are creatures of state law—they often have intervened in a manner that produces what is known as “local control.”
To the extent that local governments understand the powers they
exercise as their powers, committed to them as a matter of a seemingly pre-political right to self-determination, any effort by the state
to limit them is understood as a direct threat to local autonomy. The
experience of state-local relations suggests that once this way of
thinking about local control takes hold, it is difficult to overcome.
State law in this way creates local autonomy of a certain kind: one
that depends on the freedom of local governments to keep the taxable property in their jurisdiction from being available to benefit their
neighbors; the power of local governments to decide land use and
other regulatory matters on their own, without regard to the interests
of neighbors; and the ability of persons in a limited geographical area
to establish themselves as a distinct government entity, blessed with
the two “rights” mentioned above, and relatively immune from being
“forced” to join a neighboring jurisdiction.
C. Reconsidering the Law of Localism
Given the localist character of important features of the state law
governing state-local relations, how are we to think about state attempts to change those features? One way would be to treat such attempted changes as clear, central government threats to local autonomy that may be justified, if at all, only by appeals to the arguments
commonly offered in favor of central authority. One would note the
broader constituency of the state government and its greater size,
making exit from its jurisdiction more difficult. As an extended
sphere, the state might overcome the baleful consequences of respecting local autonomy.50 So with respect to the three localist features of state law described above, one could argue that fiscal policy
should be a state rather than a local matter to promote uniform
norms of equity;51 that land-use policy should be handled centrally

50. See Briffault, Our Localism: Part II, supra note 36, at 447–54 (arguing that “states’
greater geographic scope, superior fiscal resources and social and economic heterogeneity give
them a greater capacity to control local externalities and address interlocal and interpersonal
wealth differences”).
51. Cf. PETERSON, supra note 25, at 82 (suggesting that the national government is best
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rather than locally to counteract the parochial instincts of local folk;
and that state interests in ensuring orderly metropolitan development
necessitate state control over questions of local governmental formation and annexation that selfish local actors would undermine if left
to their own devices.
Arguments like these assume that central intervention poses a
threat to local autonomy that may be justified by an appeal to some
overriding statewide concern—a concern often rooted in a distrust of
local governmental actors. Such arguments frame disputes over retention of these localist aspects of state laws as disputes between the virtues of centralization and the virtues of decentralization. Participation
and free choice are promoted by respecting local autonomy; the virtues of uniformity and less selfish decisionmaking are promoted by
extending the sphere.
This framing of the dispute is problematic. Once it is acknowledged that localities exist within a broader state law legal structure,
the claim that there is an autonomous or reserved local sphere that
must be protected from the state becomes suspect. Central law defines the possible powers of that local sphere, and central law, by
definition, must impose limits upon the possible scope of local
power—even when it appears, on its face, to do nothing more than
promote local autonomy. The invocation of the primacy of local
authority—understood as the inviolability of the particular powers
that states have given localities at the present time—obscures this feature of local control within states. It fosters the illusion that there is
some Eden-like state in which local communities exist free of any central limitations on their powers. And in doing so, such an invocation
of local primacy implicitly naturalizes the particular powers that now
seem to constitute local autonomy, as if local autonomy as such could
not exist unless those specific powers were protected from state attempts to alter them. As a consequence, this way of framing the dispute forecloses other understandings of what local autonomy could
mean.
Consider in this regard the recent state supreme court decisions
invalidating state systems for funding public education through local
52
property taxes. One might conclude that questions of school financing sharply pit arguments for centralization against arguments for desuited to making redistributional decisions because of the structural differences between it and
lower levels of government).
52. See Cochran, supra note 42, at 402–04 n.22 (2000) (listing these decisions).
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centralization. There is a certain intuitive force to framing the issue in
this way. After all, the school financing decisions seem to limit local
autonomy in an area in which there is fairly broad agreement that it is
important to respect it. The decisions certainly have the consequence
of requiring wealthy communities to share some of their taxable
property base with neighboring jurisdictions. The decisions therefore
make the funding of local public schools dependent upon external
funding sources and deprive local communities of the autonomy that
accompanies budgetary control. They seem to require unprecedented
assertions of central authority that would upset longstanding traditions of local educational control. Indeed, in this sense, the decisions
appear to conscript local governments through central commands to
administer a state system of public education. Local governments that
want to spend their tax dollars only on their own schools are required
to share revenues with other districts.53
But framing the issue this way ignores the impact of the state law
rules that were in place prior to the restructuring of school financing
54
systems. As many state courts, and even some dissenting federal
55
judges, have recognized, the state-conferred entitlement to retain locally raised taxes, and the state-imposed limitation on revenue
sources, empower wealthy communities and disempower poorer ones.
A change in these background state law rules, therefore, frees poorer
localities from the limitations on budgetary choices that they face as a
consequence of a state law regime that ties local educational policy to
local taxable wealth.56 State-imposed mandates to share revenue in
this way enhance the local decisionmaking discretion of relatively
poor communities that at present must set educational policy within a
state law system that restricts their available funding sources to local

53. See Buse v. Smith, 247 N.W.2d 141, 143 (Wis. 1976) (applying similar logic to invalidate,
under the Wisconsin Constitution, a state law requiring compulsory sharing of local property
taxes for education).
54. See Cochran, supra note 42, at 402–11 (discussing the early positions taken by several
state courts that reliance on local property taxes for public school funding violated students’
equal protection rights).
55. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 68 (1973) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that the use of property taxes to fund public education is violative of the Equal
Protection Clause).
56. See generally JOHN E. COONS ET AL., PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION
(1970) (proposing, inter alia, that legal challenges be brought against such systems of funding
due to their impact on poorer communities); Frank Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the
Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1968) (addressing the constitutionality of inequities in school financing systems).
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property taxes. For these communities, local discretion with respect
to matters of educational policy likely will be enhanced by requiring
all localities to share some of their taxable wealth.
Even if we agree that it is important to protect local control over
education, in other words, we still would be left with the problem that
such agreement does not yield an answer to how these state constitutional challenges to inequitable school funding should be resolved.
Appeals to local control simply restate the dilemma. They do not help
to resolve it. In fact, they help to obscure it. They make the choice a
categorical one—education is either a matter for local control or it is
not. And they help to entrench current understandings of what constitutes local control at the expense of future ones by subjecting any
change in the centrally established legal framework within which local
governments operate to the criticism that it has infringed on the imperative of protecting local control. Pointing out that appeals to localism are indeterminate undermines the view that central intervention is antithetical to localism, whenever central law appears to limit
the existing quantum of discretion that localities exercise. If one believes wealthy districts are entitled to hold on to their current property taxes, then one must argue for that particular vision of local
autonomy and not simply for the more neutral-sounding concept of
localism writ large.
To see another way in which a seemingly anti-local state law intervention actually can enhance local control, consider an important
set of state law cases from New Jersey. In 1975, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of
Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel I)57 invalidated a state statutory system
of local zoning that permitted each town to zone out all multifamily
58
or low-cost housing opportunities. Here was an area of public policy—local land use—that had long been left to local decisionmaking.
Here was the state—through its courts no less—intervening to diminish the authority of each local government to zone as it wished.
The court held that the zoning power must be exercised for the
59
general welfare of the state, and thus its decision could be read to
suggest that it was treating the case as one about protecting statewide
welfare from the consequences of respecting local autonomy. But the
decision suggests a different reading as well, a reading in which
57.
58.
59.

336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975).
Id. at 734.
Id. at 725.
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Mount Laurel I is not a case about the advantages of centralization
trumping the advantages of decentralization. The court made clear
that local power already was constrained prior to its decision. Prior to
Mount Laurel I, a state system of property taxation that encouraged
zoning to take a certain exclusionary cast powerfully induced towns to
zone in certain ways.60 To keep taxes low, the towns had incentives to
zone out persons—children and the poor—who would require substantial services. Indeed, the towns were frank in making this argument as a defense to the suit in Mount Laurel I. The towns portrayed
themselves before the court not only as defenders of a right to local
self-determination but also as the hapless subjects to a state law property tax regime that gave them few real options other than “fiscal
zoning.”61 And the towns shunned by wealthier people suffered the
externalities imposed upon them by the exclusionary zoning of
wealthier jurisdictions. They became the places of “choice” for lowincome people because the poor had no way of relocating to surrounding suburbs due to the zoning restrictions adopted in those
places. Their power over their resources, in this sense, was powerfully
constrained by the power exercised by their neighbors.62
Moreover, Mount Laurel I did more than simply substitute new
constraints on local zoning practices for old ones. The decision also
arguably enhanced the power of local governments to exercise their
zoning powers in ways that would have been legally suspect prior to
the decision. The Mount Laurel I decision held that, under the state
constitution’s general welfare clause, developing municipalities were
obliged to zone in a manner that made available a reasonable oppor63
tunity for low-income housing developers. The court did not at that
time prescribe a method by which such opportunities should be made
available, and local governments largely resisted the force of the or64
der. In response, the court in Southern Burlington County NAACP
v. Township of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel II)65 ordered localities to
take affirmative measures to make low-income housing opportunities
66
available.
60. Id. at 723.
61. Id. at 731–32.
62. Id. at 733–34.
63. Id. at 728.
64. See Briffault, Our Localism: Part I, supra note 36, at 52 (noting that local governments
“dug in their heels” and “remained inactive” following the Mt. Laurel I decision).
65. 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983).
66. Id. at 443–48.
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Interestingly, as municipalities began to exercise their zoning
powers to respond to this second decision, they came under attack
from developers newly subject to locally adopted inclusionary zoning
measures—provisions that required developers to pay into an affordable housing fund in order to build, to set aside a certain number of
low-income units in new housing developments, or permitted them to
build more dense housing developments only if they agreed to such
set-asides. In bringing these challenges, the developers contested the
authority of local governments to exercise their zoning discretion in
this inclusionary manner. They argued that the state zoning enabling
act did not authorize such zoning and that state constitutional limita67
tions on the power of localities to impose taxes expressly forbade it.
They had on their side some precedent from another state that called
into doubt the authority of local governments to engage in what had
been called “socio-economic zoning,”68 and the state appellate court
69
largely agreed. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed in signifi70
cant part, and, in doing so, pointed to its prior interpretation of the
state constitution’s general welfare clause as support.71 In this respect,
the Mount Laurel I decision can be understood as altering the state
law structure within which local governments necessarily operated by
increasing local power, rather than infringing local autonomy to obtain the benefits of centralization. Local governments possessed independent powers to zone after Mount Laurel I that they arguably
lacked before it.
Finally, consider a case concerning the last of the three features
of state law that gives it a localist cast: the state law rules that promote local territorial integrity. Board of Supervisors of Sacramento
72
County v. Local Agency Formation Commission concerned a challenge to a state law that permitted residents within a spatially defined
73
territory to petition to form a new municipality. The law seemed to

67. Holmdel Builders Ass’n v. Township of Holmdel, 556 A.2d 1236, 1240–44 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1989).
68. Bd. of Supervisors of Fairfax County v. DeGroff Enters., Inc., 198 S.E.2d 600, 602 (Va.
1973).
69. See Holmdel Builders, 556 A.2d at 1243–44 (requiring that mandatory development fee
and set-aside ordinances must provide some compensating benefit to a new developer in order
to be sustainable).
70. Holmdel Builders Ass’n v. Township of Holmdel, 583 A.2d 277, 295 (N.J. 1990).
71. Id. at 286.
72. 838 P.2d 1198 (1992).
73. Id. at 1200.
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protect local autonomy by permitting persons living within a territorially defined area to determine whether to govern themselves. But in
privileging the autonomy of this group of persons, the law potentially
infringed the autonomy of neighboring localities that would be adversely affected by the new incorporation. The people of the unincorporated community were, prior to incorporation, residents of the
County of Sacramento.74 State law rules that made it easy for them to
incorporate promoted their interests in autonomy, but only at the expense of the autonomy of the county. Indeed, so strong was the competing claim for local autonomy that neighboring jurisdictions contended that the state incorporation law violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the federal Constitution by permitting only the residents of
the territory seeking to incorporate to vote on the incorporation decision.75
In rejecting this competing claim, the California Supreme Court
recognized its force. It upheld the state incorporation law in significant part because the state had attempted to balance the competing
76
claims to local autonomy. The state had provided an institutional
mechanism—a Local Agency Formation Commission comprised of
representatives chosen by affected neighboring communities—to en77
sure that the interests of other localities were taken into account. In
this respect, Sacramento County might be read to suggest that truly
liberal municipal incorporation rules, which seem protective of local
autonomy, are unconstitutional because they infringe the very real interests of neighboring communities whose interests otherwise would
not be taken into account. Indeed, as the California Supreme Court
noted, the commission was properly sensitive to the complexity of
claims for local autonomy; it approved the incorporation only if two
shopping centers were moved outside the borders of the newly incorporated town.78 Such a contingent approval was intended to ensure
that the county would not be deprived of the sales tax revenue from
the shopping centers as a consequence of the commission’s recognition of the autonomy interests of the residents seeking to incorporate.
Yet one detects even in this approach a particular idea of local autonomy. Not contemplated was a still different conception of local

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id. at 1201.
Id. at 1211.
Id. at 1200.
Id.
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autonomy in which the physical location of the shopping centers
would be legally irrelevant because the sales-tax revenues generated
by them would be pooled between the county and the new municipality.
Once the complexity of local autonomy is recognized and proponents of localism move away from a blind commitment to preventing
new state intervention in areas traditionally left to local discretion, an
analysis of the actual impacts of state intervention on local discretion
becomes necessary. One must identify those effects of central intervention that are thought to be problematic from a localist perspective,
and thus expose them to critical evaluation. Are the negative effects
on what is now understood as local autonomy outweighed by competing benefits in the form of enhanced local decisionmaking that
would result from the exercise of central power? This question should
be relevant to those interested in protecting local autonomy.
Such a localist vision would not be so malleable as to sanction all
exercises of central power. The localist argument for central lawmaking takes the justification for the central law to depend in critical
respects on its capacity to promote the values that are associated with
respecting local autonomy. A localist argument for central power
would not sanction, therefore, a central law that would effect wholesale removal of the educational system or the zoning power from the
local level to the state—such a shift in law would not promote the effective delivery of such services by localities even though it might
promote the general welfare. This vision of localism would be open,
however, to shifts in state law that limited local discretion in some respects but enhanced it in others. While effective local service delivery
would continue to be an end worth pursuing, proponents of this vision
would not be committed to preserving the current institutional arrangements for such delivery that state law has selected. As a result,
they would be open to shifts in the centrally established frameworks
within which local discretion inevitably is exercised. That openness
makes such a vision more amenable to legal changes that might promote more creative exercises of local power than the system currently
in place allows.79

79. There is a related and difficult question as to the role that local governments should be
permitted to play in identifying and approving of the need for such shifts in central frameworks.
For some thoughts on how this question might be addressed, see Dorf & Sabel, supra note 9, at
316–23 (emphasizing the important role that transparent local decisionmaking may play in
bringing about shifts in central frameworks).
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III. THE LAW OF FEDERALISM
We have seen how state law shapes, rather than limits, local
autonomy. When we turn from a consideration of how states protect
their local governments to a consideration of how states and local
governments are protected from the federal government, a surprisingly similar set of complications arise. Just as the absence of visible
state intervention may be understood to infringe local autonomy in
the state-local context, so, too, the absence of visible federal intervention can be understood to threaten state and local autonomy. This argument does not depend on establishing a formal equivalence between the state-local and the federal-state relationships. One need
not conclude that states, like local governments, are mere creatures of
some higher level of government that retains supreme power to determine the autonomy of its subordinates at any moment. One need
only recognize that states, like local governments, operate within a
broader system that imposes limits on the scope of their powers. As a
result, even a very robust law of federalism can be attentive to the
ways in which the absence of visible central power may leave state
and local governments with less autonomy than they might have if the
federal government were permitted to intervene. To see how, it is
helpful to compare some important divergences between the federalism revival of the 1970s, as reflected in the United States Supreme
Court’s important decision in National League of Cities v. Usery,80
with the recent federalism revival, as reflected in decisions such as
New York v. United States,81 Printz v. United States,82 United States v.
Lopez,83 and United States v. Morrison.84
A. The Old Federalism Revival
The key case in the United States Supreme Court’s previous attempt to revive federalism is National League of Cities v. Usery.85
There, the Court invalidated the application of the Fair Labor Standards Act’s minimum wage and maximum hour provisions to certain
86
state and local government employees. The Court held that constitu80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

426 U.S. 833 (1976).
505 U.S. 144 (1992).
521 U.S. 898 (1997).
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
529 U.S. 598 (2000).
426 U.S. 833 (1976).
Id. at 852.
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tional protections for state governmental sovereignty limited the
permissible reach of otherwise valid federal commercial regulation.87
The external limitation that the Court imposed on Congress’s power
was thought necessary to protect against “‘the utter destruction of the
State as a sovereign political entity.’”88
Much of the opinion’s analysis of central-local relations proceeded along conventional lines. The Court sought to identify a
sphere of local autonomy that the national government had infringed.
The Court explained that application of the Act to state and local
governmental employees involved in the provision of “traditional
governmental functions” exceeded the bounds of congressional
89
authority. The majority pointed to the Act’s application to employees involved in “fire prevention, police protection, sanitation, public
health, and parks and recreation” activities that it described as “typical of those performed by state and local governments in discharging
their dual functions of administering the public law and furnishing
public services.”90 Such functions, the Court continued, are those that
these “governments are created to provide” and that “States have
traditionally afforded their citizens.”91
Under this conventional framework, if a federal statute intruded
on the local sphere, the only remaining question was whether an
overriding national interest justified such an intrusion. The Court appeared to suggest that a balancing test would be applied to resolve the
dilemma.92 The interference with local autonomy apparently would be
weighed against the national interest in uniformity or protecting the
rights of workers or some similarly nationalist interest. The virtues of
respecting local autonomy would be pitted against the virtues of centralization.

87. Id.
88. Id. at 842 (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 (1968)).
89. Id. at 852.
90. Id. at 851.
91. Id. Elsewhere in the opinion, the Court appeared to add to the list “schools and hospitals.” Id. at 855. By contrast, other functions that state and local governments perform were not
of a similar constitutional stature. For example, the state or local governmental “operation of a
railroad engaged in ‘common carriage by rail in interstate commerce,’” id. at 854 n.18 (quoting
United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 182 (1936)), was not a function that “States have regarded as [an] integral part[] of their governmental activities,” id.
92. Id. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (observing that the Court’s holding does not outlaw federal power in areas where federal interests prevail and where state compliance with imposed federal standards would be essential).
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Portions of the opinion, however, gesture toward a more complicated understanding of what it means to protect local autonomy.
Here, the Court spent considerable time detailing the various ways
the federal legislation, by requiring the payment of higher wages,
would directly and appreciably disrupt the ability of local govern93
ments to provide such vital services. The involvement of the federal
government in a sphere of traditional state and local authority would
not suffice to constitute an impermissible infringement of state and
local authority. A determination that the legal line had been crossed
would depend on a determination that the federal intervention actually impaired the capacity of state and local institutions to deliver
those services.
The Court in this way provided room for an acknowledgment—
whether it intended to do so or not—that central constraints on local
capacity would remain even in the absence of a directly preemptive
central law. Consider in this regard the National League of Cities
Court’s distinction between the Fair Labor Standards Act that it invalidated and the Economic Stabilization Act, designed to combat na94
tional inflation, upheld some years earlier in Fry v. United States.
The National League of Cities Court reaffirmed Fry even though that
decision had required states and localities to comply with a federal
statutory mandate—the Economic Stabilization Act—to freeze the
wages of their employees.95 Such federal legislation clearly involved
matters traditionally handled at the state and local level, and it clearly
interfered with the state and local exercise of policymaking discretion
in some respects. Nevertheless, the National League of Cities Court
explained that the legislation upheld in Fry potentially assisted in carrying out state and local government functions.96
The federal wage and hour legislation invalidated in National
League of Cities crossed the line because it called into question the
capacity of local governments to continue to employ volunteer firefighters and even to attempt to racially integrate their police forces
because of the added expenses it would require them to incur. By
contrast, the Economic Stabilization Act, by freezing wages for public
(as well as private) employers, “operated to reduce the pressures

93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 846–48.
421 U.S. 542 (1970).
Nat’l League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852–54.
Id. at 853.
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upon state budgets rather than increase them.”97 In the absence of
central intervention to freeze wages, inflation may powerfully constrain a local government’s autonomy to set the wages of its employees (and thus to determine what kinds of services may be provided to
residents). That is because a local jurisdiction has little power to stem
inflation caused by broader national market forces; the national government alone has the power to set national monetary policy and to
define what currency may be used.98 By contrast, in the absence of
central intervention to compel the payment of higher wages, local
governments are generally free to make their own judgments, unconstrained by extralocal pressures, as to whether to set wages for their
employees above inflation.99 A federal statute that eased the budgetary pressures imposed on local governments by national inflation for

97. Id.
98. See PETERSON, supra note 25, at 28:
[S]tates and localities cannot regulate the money supply. If unemployment is low,
they cannot stimulate the economy by increasing the monetary flow. If inflationary
pressures adversely affect their competitive edge in the export market, localities can
neither restrict the money supply nor directly control prices and wages. All of these
powers are reserved for national governments.
99. It is somewhat difficult to articulate a localist argument in favor of the federal statute at
issue in National League of Cities. The statute imposed severe financial burdens on state and
local governmental service providers and appeared to do little to enhance their powers to provide such services. Nat’l League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 846–51. There certainly were not tangible,
negative extralocal externalities to which the federal legislation might have been responding.
Moreover, the interstate competition for labor in the private market would not appear to be
nearly so pressing in the market for public employees. A claim for federal intervention would
therefore depend upon classic arguments for national power. The localist argument for applying
the statute to local (as opposed to state) governments is somewhat stronger. For example, local
governments might pay lower wages to public employees than their residents might prefer, all
things considered, because of state law constraints on their revenue-raising powers, such as state
law limits on their taxing power. Or local governments might keep wages low because of a concern that increasing local taxes to pay higher wages will hurt them in the competition with
neighboring localities for taxpayers. In this respect, the federal statute might be responding to
extralocal constraints on local discretion; it establishes a uniform minimum pay scale that frees
localities wishing to pay higher wages to their employees from the potential loss in residents that
could follow in the absence of such federal intervention. An argument along these lines would
not explain, however, why the federal government should be permitted to promote local governmental autonomy at the expense of state governmental autonomy. Cf. Lawrence County v.
Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist., 469 U.S. 256, 270 (1985) (invalidating, as preempted, a state law
that required a county to disburse to a school district a portion of the federal funds that it had
received pursuant to a federal statute). The state itself could impose a uniform rule if it wanted
to free some of its local jurisdictions from the constraints imposed by such interlocal competition for taxpayers. Cf. City of La Grande v. Pub. Employe[e]s Ret. Bd., 576 P.2d 1204, 1205
(1978) (upholding a state law affecting salaries of local governmental employees against a state
constitutional home rule challenge).
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this reason stood on a different footing than federal legislation that
would have increased those same budgetary pressures.
The recognition of a substantive, material, or descriptive conception of local autonomy denaturalizes local power. It presents local
autonomy as a positive right to something—the enhancement of the
local capacity to provide governmental services—rather than a negative right from something—visible centralized lawmaking. Indeed, the
Court’s focus on the importance of protecting the provision of important local governmental services from infringement led some hopeful
commentators to see the decision as a potential source of federal constitutional welfare rights.100 On this view, the decision in National
League of Cities rested on a conception of the federal system in which
citizens had a right to expect the delivery of integral services at the local level. That this right was sufficiently strong to preclude federal
impairment suggested that the right itself had a constitutional
grounding in the individual rights provisions of the federal Constitution. That being the case, then perhaps Congress, or the courts, could
intervene to compel the provision of such local services in the face of
evidence that localities were failing to carry out such functions.101
A constitutional interest in protecting the local provision of public services would in this way operate not only as a shield against federal legislation that threatened to obstruct the delivery of such services but also as a sword to compel their delivery. Such readings of
National League of Cities, albeit inaccurate predictions about where
doctrine was headed, show the ways in which an activist vision of federal government could be reconciled with a decision that emphasized
the importance of the local provision of governmental services. Such
100. See generally Frank I. Michelman, States’ Rights and States’ Roles: Permutations of
“Sovereignty” in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165, 1172 (1977) (“[I]n
holding that the [Fair Labor Standards Act] amendments (especially as applied to municipalities) impinged upon state sovereignty, the Court . . . was using ‘sovereignty’ to stand—rather
unexpectedly—for . . . the state’s role of providing for the interests of its citizens in receiving
important social services.”); Laurence H. Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New
Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1065,
1102 (1977) (“[W]e must recognize in the Court’s concern for federalism a fear that, if state decisionmaking and the demands on state budgets are not sufficiently respected, certain individual
rights to decent levels of basic government services . . . might not be met.”).
101. See Michelman, supra note 100, at 1191 (“[J]udicial incapacity, without legislative assistance, to give . . . effect to certain inchoate rights does not imply judicial incapacity to seize upon
political actions that are visibly responsive to those inchoate rights . . . .”); Tribe, supra note 100,
at 1074–75 (discussing the potential conflicts that might arise between state governments and
the federal government upon the latter’s insistence that the former use its own funds to support
social services).
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readings of the case sought to discern a shift in the background understanding of what federal law required of local governmental institutions. They took the Court’s defense of local autonomy to rest less
in an inherent right to pay lower wages to governmental employees
than in an inherent obligation to provide important services at the local level. In so reading the decision, these commentators made nationalism and localism less inevitable rivals for authority than potential allies in the task of improving the capacity of localities to supply
services to their residents.
As is well known, the Court eventually overruled the National
League of Cities decision in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.102 There things stood until the revival of federalism began with the Court’s decisions, first in New York v. United States103
and later, and more significantly, in United States v. Lopez,104 Printz v.
105
106
United States, and United States v. Morrison. The new federalism
revival does not purport to reinstate the doctrine that National
League of Cities sought to establish, and it is not easy to find a current
defender of the National League of Cities approach to federalism.
Few now clamor for a return to a balancing test in federalism jurisprudence or for a renewed effort to define categories of traditionally
governmental activities in which Congress may not interfere even
when operating pursuant to an enumerated power. Indeed, even Justice Blackmun, who provided the tie-breaking vote in National
League of Cities, was moved to declare the National League of Cities
enterprise “unworkable” in Garcia.107
But these concerns relate primarily to how National League of
Cities addressed the question of when an overriding national interest
should suffice to trump a localist interest. If we leave that issue aside
it still is noteworthy that the Court seemed aware that federal statutes
might ease local pressures. We ordinarily think of National League of
Cities as a case that paradigmatically treats the local realm as a separate island that must be insulated from central commands for the sake
of protecting local autonomy. Yet one finds within it the pull of a
more substantive, material, or descriptive notion of local autonomy,

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985).
505 U.S. 144 (1992).
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
521 U.S. 898 (1997).
529 U.S. 598 (2000).
Garcia, 469 U.S. at 531.
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rooted in a recognition that localities exist within a larger, coordinated structure and depend at all times upon central law for their
autonomy. With this latter understanding in mind, the central government no longer appears as an inevitable threat to the protection of
local autonomy. It stands as an important protector of it.
B. The New Federalism Revival
The new federalism revival has a different character. The current
Court has not recognized the ways that seemingly anti-local central
intervention actually might promote local autonomy. It simply appeals to the imperative of protecting “local autonomy” in issuing decisions that, by constraining central power, actually may restrict local
autonomy. That is not to say that the Court’s decisions are necessarily
incorrect as a matter of constitutional law. It may be that such decisions can be defended on grounds of constitutional history or text. It
does mean, however, that the Court’s decisions should not be praised
as a useful means of promoting the benefits commonly associated
with localism. No such normative defense should be available because, by failing to attend to the baseline problem, the Court may
have done much to hamper the central government’s capacity to
promote those very benefits.
The Court’s recent decisions set forth two important federalismbased limits on federal power: external constraints on congressional
power and internal ones. External constraints are those that arise
from the Tenth Amendment or structural features of the Constitution; internal ones are those that are embedded within the clauses
that grant enumerated powers to the national government.
1. External Constraints. The anticommandeering cases, Printz v.
United States and New York v. United States, set forth a key external
limitation on congressional power to regulate even matters that
clearly affect interstate commerce.108 Although the limitation has been

108. Another important set of recent cases that set forth external constraints on congressional power are those concerning state sovereign immunity. They bar Congress from authorizing private damages actions against states—authorization that would abrogate the sovereign
immunity states would otherwise be entitled to assert against such actions. See, e.g., Alden v.
Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (holding that Congress had no constitutional authority to
authorize private actions against a nonconsenting state in its own courts through the Fair Labor
Standards Act); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996) (holding that Congress had no
constitutional authority to authorize Native Americans to bring suit against a nonconsenting
state in federal court pursuant to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act). Insofar as these cases
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criticized from many perspectives, even the critics assume that the
limitation protects local autonomy.109 Viewed from the more compliemphasize the importance of protecting state treasuries from the uncertain consequences that
would follow from private suits, they might be understood to resonate quite strongly with the
Court’s holding in National League of Cities. In both instances, the Court limits federal power to
protect more local governmental decisionmakers from federally imposed budgetary pressures
that will have direct operational impacts on efficacious local service delivery. It is difficult to
construct a localist argument for permitting such federally authorized liability judgments. A defense of them would have to proceed, therefore, on centralist grounds that emphasize the problems with respecting local decisionmaking discretion. On the other hand, it may be the sovereign immunity cases simply bespeak a formal judgment about the kind of autonomy that
sovereignty demands apart from its operational effects on actual local decisionmaking power.
That is so because the operational impacts of private damages actions on local power do not
seem to be at all central to the Court’s recent sovereign immunity decisions. It is the importance
of protecting the state from federal intervention—abstracted from any more practical inquiry—
that animates them. Indeed, precisely for that reason, the decisions hold that Congress may not
authorize even injunctive actions that name the state as the defendant. Alabama v. Pugh, 438
U.S. 781, 782 (1978) (per curiam). They also hold that local governments are categorically exempted from the protections afforded their states by this strain of doctrine—an exemption that
obviously has no logic from the localist perspective that animates the National League of Cities
decision. See generally Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890) (holding that the
Eleventh Amendment does not preclude the bringing of private suits against counties). In this
respect, it is as if the limitation on the federal power to make states suable is itself understood to
be constitutive of a legal system that is properly respectful of local power. The localist interest is
articulated in significant part as a negative limitation on central power.
109. See, e.g., Matthew Adler & Seth Kreimer, The New Etiquette of Federalism: New York,
Printz, and Yeskey, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 142–43 (assuming that commandeering would limit
local autonomy but criticizing the anticommandeering rule nonetheless); Evan Caminker,
Printz, State Sovereignty and the Limits of Formalism, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 199, 206–33 (assuming that federal commandeering would infringe local autonomy but questioning the Court’s conclusion that the Constitution protects local autonomy from such intrusion). These critics support
their argument by pointing to the range of arguably more intrusive alternatives that are left to
the federal government notwithstanding the ban on commandeering. Adler & Kreimer, supra,
at 83–119; Caminker, supra, at 233–43. They have argued that it is an odd defense of local
autonomy that encourages the federal government to achieve its ends through more intrusive
measures such as the use of federal agents, Caminker, supra, at 226–29, 237, or broader federal
preemption, Adler & Kreimer, supra, at 83–89, 95–101. See also LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 891 (3d ed. 2000) (noting that the Supreme Court’s non-balancing approach in Printz “seems troublesome” to the extent that it fails to answer the challenge that allowing Congress to do “a little conscripting of state officials” can be more federalism-friendly
than having “a vast federal army of bureaucrats administer a federal program” in some circumstances). This line of criticism appears to assume, however, that the total absence of federal intervention would be most protective of local autonomy and certainly more protective than
a federal statute that commandeered state officials. The argument presented in this Essay, by
contrast, emphasizes the way an absence of federal intervention—whether such intervention
would take the form of a federal command to states to perform background checks, a federal
regime that established a federal bureaucracy to perform such checks, or a preemptive federal
law—also would constrain local autonomy. The anticommandeering rule constitutes a constraint
on local autonomy, on this view, precisely because the alternatives to commandeering that the
federal government retains are, in fact, less effective tools for responding to interlocal negative
externalities than is a federal command to state and local agents. For the argument in this re-
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cated localist perspective suggested above, it is not clear that this assumption is accurate. In Printz, the Supreme Court held that a constitutional principle of federalism, apparently external to Congress’s
power to regulate commercial activity, invalidated a statute that
would have required local law enforcement officers to perform background checks of gun buyers.110 The Court held that the statute
impermissibly commandeered local governmental officers to administer a federal regulatory program.111 Defenders of federalism are likely
to see such a decision as a salutary defense of local against central
112
power, and, indeed, the Court itself suggested that it was engaged in
the task of ensuring just such protection.113
The decision appears to free each locality to decide for itself
whether to perform such checks. Rather than being made puppets of
the federal government, state and local law enforcement officers retain their autonomy to allocate their time and resources as they
choose. The decision therefore might seem to be in accord with that
in National League of Cities. Just as the federal statute in that case
imposed costs on local service delivery, in the form of mandates to
provide higher wages, the federal statute in this case imposed costs on
local service delivery, in the form of mandates to perform certain
time-consuming tasks—namely background checks.
But the federal statute invalidated in Printz did more than simply
limit the discretion of local law enforcement officers to decline to perform background checks. It also would have relieved many local law
enforcement agents of the burdens imposed upon them by the prior
absence of the federal command. The federal statute can be seen as
an effort to protect localities from the negative externalities created
by the operation of gun markets in neighboring jurisdictions with
comparatively lax gun control policies. Indeed, evidence suggests that
the primary benefit of a federally mandated background-check system would be to curtail the influx of guns into states with strong gun
114
laws from states that require no background check. Absent a federal
gard, see infra notes 114–16 and accompanying text.
110. Printz, 521 U.S. at 935.
111. Id.
112. See generally Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism:
Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813
(1998) (emphasizing the autonomy that states obtain from the anticommandeering rule).
113. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 935 (stating that “such commands [by the federal government]
are fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of dual sovereignty”).
114. Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence, Traffic Stop: How the Brady Act Disrupts
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requirement that background checks be conducted, some local law
enforcement agents spend time investigating gun crimes committed
with out-of-state guns that otherwise would have been devoted to
other local matters. A local jurisdiction easily could see the Printz decision, therefore, as a threat to its local autonomy. The fact that central law does not require gun markets to be jurisdictionally bounded
no doubt explains why the United States Conference of Mayors
weighed in on the side of the federal government in the case.115 For
the Conference, meaningful local control required federal intervention that would allow localities to control the availability of guns
within their boundaries so that they could pursue other policies that
gun violence frustrated.116
This defense is no less localist than the argument offered by opponents of the federal command. It, too, emphasizes the importance
of protecting local “autonomy” from external forces. It recognizes,
however, that the burdens that local jurisdictions impose upon one
another, by virtue of their proximity, complicate what “autonomy”
means. The federal statute at issue in Printz altered the baseline distribution of power between local governments. The statute did not
simply limit the capacity of local governments to determine how such
services should be provided. Why, then, should we see the statute invalidated in Printz as interfering with local control? Why not see it,
like the Economic Stabilization Act upheld in National League of
Cities, as a case of federal intervention that promotes local control?
One might object that the prohibition against federal commandeering simply requires the federal government to respond through
other, less intrusive means to the negative externalities imposed by
117
some states on others. It is a mistake to credit this objection. None
Interstate Gun Trafficking, Executive Summary, at http://www.bradycampaign.org/facts/research/
traffic.asp (Aug. 22, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
115. Brief of Amici Curiae Handgun Control, Inc. et al. at 1, Printz v. United States, 521
U.S. 898 (1997) (Nos. 95–1478, 95–1503).
116. Indeed, many local jurisdictions eager to keep guns out of their locales have asserted
their power to sue gun manufacturers for flooding gun markets in jurisdictions that have lax gun
laws. See David Kairys, The Origins and Development of the Governmental Handgun Cases, 32
CONN. L. REV. 1163, 1171–72 (2000) (discussing the suits as a response, in part, to the problem
of crimes being committed with out-of-state guns). The authority to bring such suits is defended
on what are easily understood as localist grounds. See Brent W. Landau, State Bans on City Gun
Lawsuits, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 623, 638 (2000) (arguing in favor of the right of cities to sue the
gun industry to reduce gun violence and to recover from losses suffered from such violence).
117. For example, even after Printz, the federal government may respond by directly preempting the sale of guns without background checks, thereby leaving it to local discretion
whether to supply such checks. Or it may establish its own federal bureaucracy for carrying out
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of the alternatives may be as useful a tool in responding to negative
externalities.118 Because each alternative is a less effective means of
protecting jurisdictions burdened by extralocal gun markets, the anticommandeering rule substantively limits the federal government’s
capacity to respond to negative externalities. As a result, the argument that an anticommandeering rule protects state autonomy by
granting states an entitlement that they may deploy against the federal government is quite problematic. In a case like Printz, the entitlement may empower those states that are lax in policing gun sales
but, at the same time, it disempowers those states that are suffering
the negative externalities caused by such lax gun policies. Hence, the
key question in a case like Printz is not whether the states as a whole
should have an entitlement against the federal government, but
whether some states should be benefited through the conferral of
such an entitlement over other states. Central law necessarily answers
that question in every case. The intuitive notion that freedom from

the background checks. Or it may use the spending power to encourage compliance. Or, finally,
it may authorize states to exclude out-of-state guns that were sold without background checks.
118. The anticommandeering rule applies even when, as in Printz, there is no dispute that
the federal command must be obeyed only during the period in which a federal bureaucracy is
made operable. As a result, the anticommandeering rule effectively requires localities to bear
the costs imposed by their neighbors during the interim period in which no federal bureaucracy
plausibly could be established. Similarly, a federal law that bans all gun sales except those that
have been made after a background check (without supplying a federal regime for such checks
or compelling states to provide them) establishes in unprecedented fashion a baseline legal regime that makes all gun sales presumptively unlawful under federal law. The sweeping nature of
such a measure makes it much less likely to be adopted than a statute that mandates background checks and thereby does not contemplate the possibility that gun sales could be banned
entirely as a matter of federal law. The fact that Congress may induce state and local governmental compliance, consistent with the anticommandeering rule, through spending measures is
also not significant. Insofar as the Spending Clause can be used as a means of coercing compliance, then it seems to be no different than a command, and insofar as it cannot, it leaves vulnerable the localities that would be subject to the costs imposed by those localities who reject the
funding. If the objection is just to the lack of a federal payment for the costs of complying with
the federal command, then the rule could be formulated to prohibit unfunded, but not funded,
mandates. But that would suggest that the objection to federal commandeering is not really to
commandeering per se but rather to the regulatory costs that federal intervention may impose
upon nonconsenting states. Yet compliance costs are imposed even in cases of ordinary preemption, so unless one wants to require the federal government to pay any time it imposes compliance costs, the distinction between funded and unfunded commands seems unhelpful. Finally, a
federal statute that authorized states to prohibit the entry of out-of-state guns sold without
background checks would not be an effective substitute for the federal command struck down in
Printz. Such a statute would require those states seeking to exclude such guns to bear the costs
of maintaining the barrier to entry. The federal commandeering statute, by contrast, makes each
jurisdiction responsible for performing the checks in its own states.
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central command protects local autonomy obscures the way in which
a central law may (re)distribute local autonomy.
Consider another commandeering case in which the relationship
between local autonomy and central intervention is more complicated
than the Court acknowledges. New York v. United States,119 the precursor to Printz, concerned the constitutionality of certain provisions
of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments of 1985.120
New York contended that it had no responsibility for the disposal of
the privately generated waste within its borders—indeed, that it could
refuse to permit private actors to store locally generated waste within
the state’s borders—and that the federal government could not im121
pose such a responsibility upon it. It therefore argued that the federal government had no constitutional power to command it to take
such responsibility by putting it to the “choice” of two coercive options: “take title” to all waste generated—even if by private parties—
within its borders or otherwise enact a program for disposing of locally generated waste.122 The Court ruled for New York in order to
123
protect its autonomy from a central command.
The ruling obscures the fact that the federal command had been
enacted as a response to less visible, preexisting federal constraints.
Under the federal Constitution, states may not, unless expressly
authorized by federal statute, establish interstate compacts to dispose
of waste, nor enact protectionist legislation discriminating against
124
out-of-state waste. Many states in the years prior to the enactment
of the statutory framework at issue in New York took advantage of
125
these rules and declined to approve their own waste disposal sites.
The few states that had approved disposal sites thus were fast becoming home to huge amounts of out-of-state waste. The sited states
eventually threatened to get out of the waste disposal business altogether; given background federal law, they had no other means of
avoiding becoming the dumping ground for the bulk of the nation’s
hazardous waste.126 Had they shut down the sites in their states, there
119. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
120. Id. at 149.
121. Id. at 154.
122. Id. at 169.
123. Id. at 151–54.
124. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978).
125. New York, 505 U.S. at 151.
126. Brief for the United States at 3, New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 114 (1992) (Nos.
91–543, 91–558, 91–563).
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would have been a real risk that no sites would be available for disposing of hazardous waste. In that event, the federal government (as
well as the states themselves) would have been forced to tolerate the
shutting down of waste-generating industries—hardly a tolerable option. Or, to avoid such an occurrence, the federal government would
have been forced to establish its own disposal sites within certain
states (thereby ousting states of any real say over the siting process).127
In the face of this looming crisis, the states collectively proposed
128
to Congress a complex federal statutory framework. The proposal
sought to ensure that states would retain control over the siting process and that the federal government would not assume power over
129
siting decisions. It also sought to ensure that the sited states would
not become national dumping grounds.130 The proposed framework,
as enacted, authorized the states to enter into regional compacts with
other states for waste disposal and to impose otherwise impermissibly
discriminatory surcharges on waste from states not part of a compact
for a period of years.131 The framework further authorized sited states,
and those in compact with them, to deny access outright to nonmember states after that statutorily prescribed period of years had
ended.132 Only then would states that continued to generate waste but
had not entered into a compact be required to take title to the waste
generated in their jurisdiction or otherwise establish a means of disposing of such waste.133
As the sited states explained in their amicus brief to the Supreme
Court, the supposedly “coercive” provisions had been critical to the
134
success of the entire, state-friendly federal framework. The provisions induced states to enter into compacts rather than bet that
enough of them would hold out to precipitate a crisis that would occasion wholesale federal intervention, which would result in states los127. Id. at 4; Brief for States of Washington, Nevada and South Carolina at 2–10, New York
v. United States, 505 U.S. 114 (1992) (Nos. 91–543, 91–558, 91–563) (recounting the history of
the crisis).
128. New York, 505 U.S. at 151.
129. Brief for States of Washington, Nevada and South Carolina at 8–9, New York (Nos. 91–
543, 91–558, 91–563).
130. Id. at 12.
131. New York, 505 U.S. at 151–52.
132. Id. at 152.
133. Brief for the United States at 13, New York (Nos. 91–543, 91–558, 91–563).
134. Brief for States of Washington, Nevada and South Carolina at 4–9, New York (Nos. 91–
543, 91–558, 91–563) (describing how the states acted in the interest of federalism to avoid a national solution to the problem).
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ing control of the siting process.135 Indeed, a prior state-proposed federal framework that did not include the “take title” provisions had
failed to induce enough states to enter into regional compacts to ensure that sufficient waste disposal sites would be available for wastegenerators. As a result, Congress simply had extended the time during which the sited states would have to take in out-of-state waste,
thereby imposing the costs of choices by recalcitrant states on neighbors.136 In this way, a legal regime that relied ultimately on federal
preemption (rather than individual state responsibility) for the disposal of locally generated waste threatened to subject some states to
harms beyond their control. The coercive “take title” provisions, from
this perspective, mitigated that threat.
Prior to the adoption of the coercive federal statute there was already a federal law regime in place that constrained state autonomy.
That regime entitled some states to take no responsibility for—and,
indeed, even to preclude private actors from assuming responsibility
for—disposing of the waste that they chose to permit industries within
their borders to generate. That regime was not obviously more respectful of state power than the regime that the federal statute sought
to bring into place. Congress, in deciding how to respond to the waste
disposal crisis, was therefore called upon to make a number of policy
decisions about what kind of state autonomy it should promote.
Should it protect the power of states to exclude out-of-state waste or
should it protect the power of states to compel the export of in-state
waste? Should it secure the power of states to make decisions about
whether to provide for the disposal of waste that they had permitted
to be generated within their borders, or should it instead take account
of how one state’s decision to decline to provide for such disposal
would impact the discretion of neighboring states? Should it, in short,
treat a state’s decision to provide no means of disposing of locally
generated waste as an expression of local autonomy or as a threat to
the autonomy of neighbors? In making these judgments, the national
government was not clearly choosing whether to trump local autonomy in the name of vindicating some higher, national objective. Nor
was it, in enacting seemingly “coercive” measures, choosing to disregard the autonomy of the states. It was instead attempting to craft a

135. Id.
136. Id. at 25 (recounting the burdens incurred by the sited states as a result of the extension
Congress granted).
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solution to an interstate problem in which there was no clear baseline
from which a claim for local autonomy could proceed.
In this regard, it is problematic to argue that the anticommandeering rule respects a state’s right not to be “used” by the federal
government as if it were a mere extension of the national legislature.
New York was mandated, in effect, to take responsibility for the disposal of that waste generated within its borders. It is not evident that
a national legal judgment that a state is responsible for disposing of—
or providing a means for disposing of—those dangerous substances
generated within its borders makes a state the mere extension of the
federal sovereign’s will. Unless one can explain persuasively why a
state’s autonomy depends upon its power to choose to take no responsibility for the waste that it voluntarily permits industries within
its borders to generate (and thus to shift the costs of such a choice
onto neighboring states), the claim that a state has been “used” by
being made responsible for such a choice has a hollow ring. One
could conclude just as easily that the prior legal regime permitted
New York to “use” the sited states. Thus, the argument for the exercise of national power in a case like New York is itself localist. It
seeks to promote the capacity of local jurisdictions to make their own
judgments for the very reasons commonly thought to justify decentralized decisionmaking. It does not depend on a defense of an overriding national judgment as to how waste should be disposed of locally.137
2. Internal Constraints. Evidence of a similarly problematic approach to central-local relations may be discerned in the cases that
make up perhaps the most dramatic aspect of the recent federalism
revival—cases that identify internal constraints on the clauses of the
137. It is true that Congress retained the power to threaten to preempt state siting decisions
in the event that states failed to dispose of waste on their own or to enter into compacts with
other sited states. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992) (“[W]here Congress
has the authority to regulate private activity under the Commerce Clause, we have recognized
Congress’ power to offer States the choice of regulating that activity according to federal standards or having state law pre-empted by federal regulation.”). But the States’ own fear of giving
up control of the siting process to the federal government had led them to propose a framework
in which that option would not be available. See Brief for States of Washington, Nevada and
South Carolina at 12–15, New York (Nos. 91–543, 91–558, 91–563) (“Each state . . . asked Congress to defer to the states’ sovereign desire to be responsible for low-level radioactive waste
generated within their respective borders.”). And the difficulties of bringing about such federal
preemption was sure to extend the time during which the sited states would have to bear the
costs of their neighbors in order to avert a crisis that would result in the shutting down of vital
industries in neighboring states on which they, too, depended.
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Constitution that grant power to Congress. There are two sets of relevant cases here: those relying on internal constraints to limit the
power of Congress to exercise its commerce authority and those relying on internal constraints to limit the power of Congress to legislate pursuant to the enforcement clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. For present purposes, it is sufficient to consider in detail only
the former line of precedent, though there is an important resonance
between the two.138
The first of the cases that place internal constraints on congressional commerce authority in order to protect local power is United
139
States v. Lopez. The case concerned whether Congress possessed
authority under the Commerce Clause to make it a criminal offense
to possess a firearm within one thousand feet of a school.140 The main
opinion, authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, held that it did not.141
The opinion noted that the Commerce Clause only empowers Congress to regulate commerce among the states, and that the statutory
provision at issue did not appear to regulate commercial activity at

138. The Section 5 cases in general concern federal statutes that are designed to abrogate
the state sovereign immunity recognized by the Court as constitutionally ordained in the cases
already discussed. In this sense, they are derivative of the localist vision that underlies those decisions. See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 64 (2000) (holding invalid, under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress’s intent to abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity through the Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 630 (1999) (holding invalid, under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress’s intent to abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity
through a series of patent law amendments). Two important exceptions, however, concern City
of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). The
Section 5 analysis in Morrison turned largely on the question of what constitutes “state action,”
because the federal remedy ran against a private party rather than the government, and thus it
did not implicate directly concerns about protecting local from state power. 529 U.S. at 619–27.
City of Boerne stands as a possible exception to the current Court’s general disinterest in examining the impacts of federal legislation on local service delivery. See 521 U.S. at 532 (noting
that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act would intrude “at every level of government” due
to its sweeping coverage). At the same time, it is not clear that these decisions are driven purely
by a localist concern as opposed to a deeper concern about the propriety of congressional, as
opposed to judicial, constitutional interpretation. See TRIBE, supra note 109, at 949 n.121 (discussing the extent of Congress’s authority to interpret the provisions of the Bill of Rights in a
situation in which institutional constraints led the courts to adopt a less intrusive interpretation
from among those textually and historically plausible options); Michael W. McConnell, Comment, Institutions and Interpretations: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV.
153, 153–57 (1997) (characterizing Boerne as involving a clash over the relationship between
congressional and judicial authority to interpret constitutional rights).
139. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
140. Id. at 551.
141. Id.
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all.142 The Court offered a functional reason for obeying that limitation. Such obeisance will ensure that the Court will not permit the
federal government to “‘obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local, and create a completely centralized government.’”143
In rejecting the federal government’s contention that the target
of federal laws—here gun possession near a school—need not be
commercial activity in order for Congress to regulate it, the Court
elaborated on the connection between limiting Congress’s commerce
power and local autonomy. The Court held that the United States’s
position would permit Congress to regulate all violent crime or activ144
ity that might lead to violent crime. And why might that be problematic? If the government need only show that its regulation is necessary to protect national economic productivity, then it arguably
could regulate “family law (including marriage, divorce, and child
custody).”145 It then would be “difficult to perceive any limitation on
federal power, even in areas such as criminal law enforcement or edu146
cation where States historically have been sovereign.” The opinion
concluded by stating that unless the line is held here “there never will
be a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly lo147
cal.”
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, which Justice O’Connor joined,
showed signs of a more complicated conception of local autonomy.
The concurrence inquired into the actual effects of the federal legislation on the capacity of local jurisdictions to make independent judgments as to how to respond to the problem of guns near schools. In
doing so, it implicitly acknowledges that federal legislation might facilitate state and local policymaking rather than simply stifling it. It
therefore harkens back to the distinction drawn in National League of
Cities between a federal command that drains resources from localities and one that eases the resource pressures they would face in the
absence of federal intervention.

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 559–67.
Id. at 557 (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)).
Id. at 564.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 567–68.
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Justice Kennedy explained that, at least in instances where Con148
gress seeks to target noncommercial activity, “we must inquire
whether the exercise of national power seeks to intrude upon an area
149
of traditional state concern.” Here, Kennedy noted that “it is well
established that education is a traditional concern of the States.”150 As
a result, he explained that there is “a particular duty to ensure that
151
the federal-state balance is not destroyed.”
As Justice Kennedy recounted the nature of the central-local
clash, he saw evidence that the exercise of federal power would interfere with local policymaking with respect to education. He acknowledged that few states would adopt a policy favoring the carrying of
firearms in or near schools, but contended that states might disagree
as to whether criminalizing gun possession near schools is an effective
152
means of addressing the problem. He noted that alternative approaches could include amnesty programs, the imposition of penalties
on parents or guardians rather than on child gun possessors directly,
or programs for expelling students carrying such weapons that would
153
send offenders to special facilities rather than prisons. He suggested
that central authority is problematic because of the limits that federal
power places on the capacity of local actors to respond to an ac154
knowledged problem—guns in and near schools. He concluded that
the federal criminal statute “forecloses the States from experimenting
and exercising their own judgment in an area to which States lay
155
claim by right of history and expertise.”
Whether or not the concurrence’s examination of the effects of
156
the federal legislation on local discretion is persuasive, the signifi148. Id. at 577 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Were the Federal Government to take over the
regulation of entire areas of traditional state concern, areas having nothing to do with the regulation of commercial activities, the boundaries between the spheres of federal and state authority would blur and political responsibility would become illusory.”).
149. Id. at 580.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 581.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 582.
154. Id. at 581–82.
155. Id. at 583.
156. It is a potentially awkward argument in light of the concession that forty states have
adopted criminal provisions of their own that are analogous and that would seem equally to
foreclose the kinds of experimental approaches that he advocates. There is no indication that
Justice Kennedy means to suggest that the federal criminal legislation of this kind would be invalid only in states that had no parallel state law criminal statutes. The contention is potentially
problematic, given the fact that the federal statute does not of its own force compel prosecutions
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cant point is that the concurrence, unlike the majority opinion, does
not view the extension of federal legislation into a realm traditionally
policed locally as dispositive. Further inquiry into the effects of the
federal legislation on local decisionmaking remains appropriate. In
this sense, the analysis is driven by an affirmative vision of local
autonomy—and a willingness to examine the way national power
might aid local action—rather than a negative aversion to central intervention.
United States v. Morrison,157 the next decision of the Court to
place an internal limitation on the scope of the federal commerce
power, did not pursue this more complex approach. Morrison invalidated a provision of the Violence Against Women Act that provided
victims a civil remedy against perpetrators of gender-motivated vio158
lence. As in Lopez, the Court decided that the statute impermissibly
extended the federal regulatory sphere to include noncommercial action.159 In doing so, the Court did not mention the quasi-balancing test
to which Justice Kennedy had been attracted in Lopez. The Court instead adopted a virtually categorical approach. It drew a sharp line
between commercial and noncommercial activity in order to preserve
traditional state and local governmental functions, without regard to
the particularized effect that the federal legislation might have on the
carrying out of such functions.160
Noting the noncommercial nature of the violent criminal activity
targeted by the federal civil remedy, the Court concluded that “the
concern that we expressed in Lopez that Congress might use the
Commerce Clause to completely obliterate the Constitution’s distinc161
tion between national and local authority seems well founded.”
“[T]he suppression of [violence] has always been the prime object of
162
the States’ police power,” the Court emphasized. The federal government’s defense of the statute would have permitted the Congress
in every case; presumably, United States Attorneys, who are operating at the local level after
all, retain the traditional prosecutorial discretion to bring cases in a manner that will not impede
effective means of reducing gun possession near schools. See generally Michael Simons, Prosecutorial Discretion and Prosecution Guidelines: A Case Study in Controlling Federalization, 75
N.Y.U. L. REV. 893 (2000) (discussing the role of federal prosecutorial discretion in vindicating
federalism values).
157. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
158. Id. at 602.
159. Id. at 627.
160. Id. at 615.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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“to regulate murder or any type of violence since gender-motivated
violence, as a subset of all violent crime, is certain to have lesser economic impacts than the larger class of which it is a part.”163 To emphasize its concern that the breach of the commercial/noncommercial distinction would threaten local power, the Court explained that
“[p]etitioners’ reasoning . . . may . . . be applied equally as well to
family law and other areas of traditional state regulation since the aggregate effect of marriage, divorce, and childrearing on the national
economy is undoubtedly significant.”164 Such a view of the scope of
Congress’s commerce power is impermissible because “[t]he Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly national and what
is truly local.”165
In Lopez, the dissenters had emphasized the plausible connec166
tion between gun possession and interstate commerce. In Morrison,
they now concluded that the desire to preserve a distinct domain of
local authority, and not simply a skepticism about what substantially
affects interstate commercial activity, motivated the Court’s newfound interest in delimiting bounds to the commerce power. As Justice Souter put it:
If we now ask why the formalistic economic/noneconomic distinction might matter today . . . the answer is not that the majority fails
to see causal connections in an integrated economic world. The answer is that in the minds of the majority there is a new animating
theory that makes categorical formalism seem useful again. Just as
the old formalism had value in the service of an economic conception, the new one is useful in serving a conception of federalism. It is
the instrument by which assertions of national power are to be limited in favor of preserving a supposedly discernible, proper sphere of
state autonomy to legislate or refrain from legislating as the individ167
ual States see fit.

The Morrison dissenters objected not only that the majority
overlooked the interconnectedness of modern commercial society,
but also that its vision of what it means to protect local control was
too limited. In making this point, Justice Souter returned to the dis-

163. Id.
164. Id. at 615–16.
165. Id. at 617–18 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 568 (1995)).
166. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 623 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (joined by Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
167. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 644–45 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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tinction the National League of Cities Court drew between the Fair
Labor Standards Act and the Economic Stabilization Act. Justice
Souter questioned the majority’s assumption that limiting federal
power would promote local autonomy, arguing that the majority
“finds no significance whatever in the state support for the Act based
upon the States’ acknowledged failure to deal adequately with gender-based violence in state courts, and the belief of their own law enforcement agencies that national action is essential.”168 He therefore
concluded that “[i]t is, then, not the least irony of these cases that the
States will be forced to enjoy the new federalism whether they want it
or not.”169
Indeed, the majority of the state attorneys general argued to the
Court that, far from limiting the capacity of states to serve their constituents, the federal statute actually enhanced it. As they explained,
domestic violence imposed enormous costs on state-delivered welfare
170
and medical services —services that often were provided only by virtue of the states’ need to comply with federal legislation. It was
largely states and local governments, therefore, that had to bear the
financial burden of such violence, and in large part because of the
structure of federal entitlement programs. More fundamentally, the
federal remedy supplied by the Violence Against Women Act was,
they argued, entirely complementary with ongoing state law reform
efforts concerning domestic and gender-motivated violence.171 The
remedy did not preempt state and local remedies, and it was keyed to
a violation of state or local law.172 As the brief of the state attorneys
general put it, the federal statute supplied a remedy that was useful in
the interim while state and local reform efforts began to produce state
and local laws regulating violence against women that were similar to
the one supplied by the federal statute.173 It would free them from
budgetary pressures during the reform period—pressures they would

168. Id. at 653.
169. Id. at 654.
170. Brief of Amici Curiae State of Arizona et al. at 9–15, United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598 (2000) (Nos. 99–5, 99–29).
171. Id. at 21–23.
172. See id. at 21 (“The crimes that are actionable under [the Violence Against Women
Act’s] civil provisions are defined by reference to existing federal and state law.”).
173. See id. (“By providing the civil remedy, Congress made it possible for gender-based
violence—and its impact on interstate commerce—to be redressed now, while States continue to
reform and refine their approaches to this scourge.”).
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face as a consequence of their obligation to comply with provisions of
federal entitlement programs.
There are problems with simply deferring to the argument of the
attorneys general. They may not be representative of states’ interests,
and their characterization of the federal statute as supplemental is, of
course, subject to the rejoinder that it was preemptive of those states
that already had chosen not to make residents liable for gendermotivated violence through specific tort actions targeting that kind of
violence. Precisely because of the difficulty of distinguishing preemptive from supplemental central legislation, however, their argument
reveals that more was at stake in Morrison than simply protecting the
local sphere from central power. Protecting the local sphere from the
national sphere also imposes costs on the local sphere that might have
been mitigated by the central law intervention at issue.
C. Comparing the Old and the New
National League of Cities’ distinction between the Fair Labor
Standards Act and the Economic Stabilization Act pushed to the fore
questions about what it means to protect local autonomy. It made
visible the pressures on local governments that come from sources
other than directly preemptive central power. And it suggested a potential distinction between a procedural, formal, or ascriptive idea of
local autonomy—in which limiting visible central power is emphasized—and a substantive, material, or descriptive idea of local autonomy—in which the limits on effective decisionmaking capacity imposed by background central laws are emphasized. The current
Court’s approach, by contrast, suggests that the localist interest can
be served simply by limiting visible central power and that the exercise of visible central power that limits the discretion of a local jurisdiction cannot at the same time promote localism.174
174. This comparative analysis does not show that National League of Cities is in some objective sense more protective of federal power than the cases that comprise the current federalism revival. The localist vision pursued in National League of Cities, it must be remembered,
invalidated the application of the requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act to state and
local governments. Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 855–56 (1976). The current
localist vision compels no such result. States remain subject to the commands of the Fair Labor
Standards Act under the new regime. Recent developments in the law of sovereign immunity do
bar states from being subjected to monetary damages for violating those requirements, but local
governments, as has been noted, are not similarly protected. See supra note 108. They remain
subject to damages claims for violating the Act. In this sense, Congress arguably enjoys more
authority under the current federalism revival than it did under its predecessor. Nor does this
analysis show that Morrison and Lopez have it wrong in their enunciation of internal Commerce
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It is useful in this regard to call attention to the article for this
175
conference by Professors Baker and Young. Baker and Young attempt to defend the recent federalism revival in negative terms by
appealing to the importance of “autonomy,” understood as the condition of being free to choose for oneself. In arguing that a defense of
states’ rights should not be held to account for the content of state
decisionmaking, they conclude that a “state’s freedom from federal
interference, like an individual’s freedom from governmental restrictions on expression or private choices, is an essentially negative freedom.”176
Their emphasis on autonomy, and the negative rights from central interference that it implies, suggests a neutral baseline from
which local autonomy can be defended. It naturalizes the legal world
that “precedes” central intervention as one respectful of autonomy. It
presumes that state and local governments are autonomous prior to
visible central lawmaking in the way that many imagine private individuals to be free prior to governmental regulation. Yet Baker and
Young implicitly (if unintentionally) acknowledge elsewhere in their
argument that this presumption of autonomy is mistaken. In arguing
that exercises of central preemptive power often constitute “horizon177
tal aggrandizements” by some states over others, they necessarily
concede that the actions of some localities affect those of others, and
that changes in central power distribute, rather than simply infringe,
local power. It is that concession that underlies their concern that
some states could gain at the expense of others through an exercise of
federal law.
It is true that one can always leave a particular locality, as they
suggest, while one cannot exit so easily the central system. But the invocation of the right to exit does not thereby reveal central power
necessarily to be a threat to local autonomy. Indeed, ironically, the
right to exit is itself—as we saw in the context of the New York decision—a background rule of central law that can infringe local autonomy as surely as it can justify its defense. For example, it is precisely
because central law usually permits boundaries to be relatively porous—in the New York case permitting companies to exercise “the
Clause limits that track a commercial/noncommercial line. Nothing offered above counts as a
sufficient argument about the proper constitutional interpretation of the Commerce Clause.
175. Lynn A. Baker and Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial
Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75 (2001).
176. Id. at 134.
177. See id. at 117–28.
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right to exit” by shipping their waste out-of-state—that the costs of a
“local” policy often are passed on to a neighboring jurisdiction. In
other words, central lawmaking of the kind that Baker and Young
fear in fact may free (many) local jurisdictions from less visible background constraints that act as real limits on their capacity to
“choose.” It therefore may vindicate the very values that are said to
attach to the protection of local autonomy.
A procedural, formal, or ascriptive defense of local autonomy of
the kind Baker and Young offer has little to commend it once its monopolistic claim on the attractive values associated with local autonomy is stripped away. Thus, its proponents must do more than trumpet the importance of keeping states and localities “free” from central
interference. They must explain why it makes sense to think of states
as free in the first place, and why the kind of freedom they would possess absent visible central intervention is preferable to the kind of
freedom that they would possess in its presence. As we have seen, inscribed within such a defense of local autonomy is a particular, but
contestable, idea of local autonomy—one that conceives of localities
as independent, free islands that must be protected from a leviathan
above. But if our concern is not with preserving some imagined zone
of preexisting local autonomy from central interference, then it becomes clear that other ideas of local autonomy are available. Such
ideas could take the central government’s exercise of visible preemptive power to be an important means of promoting local power. For
example, the horizontal aggrandizements that Baker and Young fear
instead might be reconceived as instances of interlocal collective action that central law can make uniquely possible. If central law wishes
to protect localities as if they were islands, then it must resist collective solutions unless they are unanimous, as Baker and Young suggest. But if it wishes to empower localities to overcome the irresponsible actions of holdouts, then it must enact a rule system that permits
collective solutions, even though they are not approved unanimously.
That is the kind of choice central law faces when it seeks to protect
local autonomy. In making that choice, the central government will
not unambiguously vindicate local autonomy no matter how it acts; it
will infringe it by attempting to promote it or by choosing one idea of
local autonomy at the expense of others. But that is inevitably the
case when the limits on local power come from some source other
than the visible intervention of the central government itself.
At the level of current doctrine, the Court’s formal rules categorically proscribing certain means of central intervention are un-
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likely to protect local autonomy in any sense but the ascriptive one.
They are ill-suited to distinguish between the two kinds of central
lawmaking identified at the outset: those that promote some independent central governmental interest and those that respond to the
extralocal pressures that local jurisdictions face even in the absence of
direct and visible central intervention.
One might object that the current Court’s impulse to fashion a
federalism doctrine that has this categorical cast arises from a felt
need to ensure that modern doctrine reflects respect for states as independent actors within the constitutional structure. Given the limits
of the judicial role, the current Court’s approach therefore simply
may be an effort to fashion a plausible doctrine to that end. The establishment of clean lines—legislation that preempts state power is
permissible, but regulation that commandeers state power to administer federal programs is not; commercial activity may be regulated, but
noncommercial activity may not—does overcome the concerns about
workability that led Justice Blackmun to abandon the National
League of Cities approach in Garcia. The current federalism project
might be said, therefore, to have the virtues of a formally realizable
doctrine. It may be unconcerned with the operational effects of federal legislation on effective local governmental service provision in a
particular case, but if we are thinking about how to provide meaningful protection for local power, we cannot investigate operational impacts each time. Perhaps we are better off simply articulating some
clear lines of demarcation, easily applied, and leaving it at that.
There are reasons to be skeptical of this defense of the Court’s
approach. If the federal statutes invalidated by the recent cases actually were redistributing or facilitating local power rather than simply
limiting it, then an approach to central-local relations that prohibits
such redistribution or facilitation may do affirmative harm to the values associated with the defense of local autonomy. In other words,
the problem is not just that the doctrine covers some cases in which
federal power is not a threat to local autonomy. The problem is that
the doctrine entrenches existing limitations on local autonomy in the
name of protecting it. And it does so needlessly.
It is not obvious that it makes sense to establish an anticommandeering rule at the level of generality at which it is now pitched. As a
general matter, a prohibition against commandeering might be
thought to preserve the kind of localist interest that underlay National
League of Cities. Federal commands to carry out national functions
such as federal park maintenance, for example, would not appear to
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vindicate any easily identifiable, offsetting localist interest. But consider a rule that distinguished between, on the one hand, cases in
which the federal command protected some jurisdictions from the
harms imposed by neighbors, and, on the other, cases in which the
command simply foisted federal responsibilities onto local actors.
Under such a rule, the federal government could not command states
or localities to maintain federally owned lands, though it could command them to take responsibility for the extralocal costs that they
impose on neighbors. That rule might itself unduly privilege the importance of formal legal title, but it would not require one to identify
traditionally local governmental functions. Nor would it require one
to weigh the interest in local autonomy against the competing compelling national interest. Such a rule would not seem to be unworkable, therefore, in the way that the National League of Cities’ balancing test was unworkable.178 In instances where competing localist
interests are affected by central intervention, it is not clear which localist interest should predominate. Precisely because such judgments
are indeterminate, however, it is problematic to adopt a rule that resolves all of them by limiting the federal government’s power to alter
the current distribution of local autonomy, as the Court recently has
done. An anticommandeering rule limited to circumstances in which
no competing localist interests were present would vindicate the interest in localism without threatening it at the same time.
One might object that there is always some localist interest that
can be offered on behalf of federal intervention, and thus there is no
limit under such a view to the scope of central power. Of course, if
such localist arguments have force, then it is hard to see how localism
would support a legal regime that per se rejects such localist defenses
of federal intervention. If the objection is rooted instead in a suspicion that many localist arguments are really pretextual, then one is
really contending only that some localist arguments are better than
others and that it is important to distinguish the strong localist arguments from the weak ones. Our understanding of why it is worth pro-

178. It would require one to distinguish between the two kinds of central intervention identified at the outset. There will no doubt be cases at the margin, but so, too, are there cases at the
margin under the current doctrine. See TRIBE, supra note 109, at 893 (noting problems with the
workability of the supposedly bright-line rule that the Court fashioned in Printz v. United States,
521 U.S. 98 (1997)). What distinguishes commandeering from preemption? What is commercial
activity and what is not? Even the most categorical of doctrines is not immune from such classification concerns.
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tecting local autonomy would profit from a legal regime that required
us to articulate just such distinctions.
Indeed, once one sees the complicated nature of local autonomy
one also might see the problems with allowing the Court in particular
to resolve them. The Court might be a particularly poor institution to
protect local autonomy precisely because the context of litigation encourages the Court to conceive of the defendant jurisdiction as an island under attack from central power. The litigation context obscures
the ways central intervention distributes power across myriad local
jurisdictions, altering their relations to one another, and affecting
their capacity to respond to a variety of extralocal pressures. No single state is well-suited to represent the often divergent understandings of local autonomy of their neighbors.179
The case for reform is somewhat less compelling with respect to
the decisions that identify internal limits on Congress’s powers.
There, too, the Court’s current means of drawing lines seems to ignore the ways central power may be facilitating local power even as it
preempts some local policymaking discretion. But it may be that
there is no more workable manner of enforcing some limitation on
federal authority. This observation, however, may only indicate that
such internal constraints ultimately serve as a poor means of providing protection for local power, even if there are other reasons for
concluding that they are justified—such as, perhaps, limiting the
scope of private liability for violent crimes. In fact, an argument along
these lines may emanate more from a nationalist judgment about the
amount of liability to which individuals should be subject in our constitutional order than from a distinctly localist one. Indeed, one might
conclude that a nationalist concern with individual liberty underlies
the Court’s decision in Morrison and trumps the competing localist
concern that the state attorneys general may have pressed. In this re-

179. There are, to be sure, risks in permitting the central legislature to be the protector of
local autonomy—it may overreach in the opposite direction. One may expect that in intervening
to distribute local autonomy, the central government may impose restrictions that are not necessary to any plausibly localist end. As well, one might contend that if the Court is a problematic
arbiter of the content of local autonomy in this context, then it may also be a problematic arbiter in the context of state-local legal relations, thereby calling into question the propriety of decision like Mt. Laurel. But it should be noted that the Mt. Laurel Court issued its decision with a
clear grasp that far more was at stake in that case than a simple clash between the autonomy of
a single, island jurisdiction and the central government. At stake instead, the court realized, was
the background rule structure which constrains, and empowers, local governments generally in
New Jersey. It is that larger perspective on central-local relations that the United States Supreme Court’s recent federalism decisions consistently eschew.
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gard, Morrison promotes an independent national interest more than
a localist one. Even if the decision is correct, in other words, it is not
at all clear that it is correct because it protects local autonomy.
That arguments on behalf of local autonomy may be made in defense of central lawmaking does not mean that only localist arguments may be used in defense of central power. There are reasons, as
noted above, for exercising national power even when it will trump
local autonomy. But it is important to distinguish the cases in which
the argument for national power rests on distinctly nationalist claims
from the cases in which it rests on localist claims. The distinction is
important because the traditional reasons for preferring centralized
decisionmaking over local decisionmaking may not seem sufficiently
strong in some cases. In those cases, it should be recognized that the
centralized decision may promote the very values that warrant respect
for local autonomy. For this reason, a legal regime that would permit
the federal government to exercise power more freely than the current decisions permit cannot easily be described as centralist.
CONCLUSION
The discussion of the federalism revival should be seen as part of
a broader, and more deeply rooted, but also clearly contestable, way
of thinking about how central governments can protect local power.
The way of thinking about localism that the recent federalism revival
reflects should be troubling even to those who find themselves attracted by the recent tilt towards localism. It should be troubling because of the risk that it will prevent us from thinking creatively about
ways central governments can promote local power at the very moment when an affinity for localist values suggests the virtues in doing
just that.
There is a growing recognition that the role of central government should not be to supplant local decisionmaking so much as to
encourage local jurisdictions to understand their role as components
of a larger coordinated system that benefits from cooperative interlocal behavior. At the state level, this recognition has led to proposals
for reform in which new state laws operate not simply to limit local
discretion because of state-wide concerns but rather to encourage local governments to understand their interconnections with other
communities. These proposals—marching under the banner of the
new regionalism—suggest that old distinctions between the central
and the local may not be helpful. The important ground of inquiry
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concerns how background rules of central law may be adjusted to foster and promote beneficial interlocal cooperation.180
At the federal level too, there is an increasing emphasis on deploying central power to promote interconnection among local decisionmakers. Charles Sabel and Michael Dorf have suggested the ways
in which national central power can be deployed, and, indeed, must
be deployed, to engage local decisionmakers in effective problem
181
solving. They do not seek to increase the amount of discretion that
local jurisdictions now have simply for the sake of empowering local
decisionmakers. Rather, they seek to establish central frameworks
that will make it possible for the central government to learn about
potentially generalizable solutions to pressing problems from local
decisionmakers.182 Again, these reform proposals emphasize the importance of local discretion while refusing to distinguish sharply be183
tween the central and local realms.
In light of these reform proposals, we should not criticize the
federalism revival only for its doctrinal excesses. Nor should we feel
compelled to romanticize central power (or demonize local power) in
order to object to the Court’s current localist path. We should instead
challenge the now-ascendant vision of what protecting local autonomy demands. Not all arguments for central power are of a similar
character. Some seek to vindicate a competing central governmental
policy that is thought to be of such importance that it trumps any
competing interest in localism. Other arguments for central power,
however, should be understood as localist arguments in their own
right. Persons attracted to the virtues of local decisionmaking should
be suspicious of an emerging legal regime that refuses to attend to
such distinctions—even if that legal regime purports to be vindicating
localist virtues.

180. See e.g., FRUG, supra note 9, at 85–91 (suggesting that city power and local government
could be used to promote community building); Gillette, supra note 9, at 195 (discussing the role
that background rules of state law play in frustrating and inducing interlocal bargains).
181. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 9, at 316–23 (analyzing the form of democracy resulting
from public choices made by means of tiered councils that collaborate with local citizens to organize service provision).
182. Id.
183. Id.

